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Invisible Constraints: The Relationship among Non-Competition Agreements, Inventor Mobility, and Patent Commercialization

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  • Hsini Huang

Abstract

To advance our understanding of the institutional-level influence of intellectual property policies on innovation, this article investigates a set of hypotheses questioning the links between state-level non-competition agreements, inventor mobility, and patent commercialization. It uses US inventor survey data covering a sample of 1,900 triadic patents. Results provide some evidence in support of the prevalent, yet under-researched, proposition that mobile inventors perform better than non-mobile ones in terms of commercialization activity. This article also finds that the severity of judicial enforcement of non-competition agreements has hampered the positive contribution of inventor mobility to invention commercialization and concludes that legal infrastructure is a crucial factor in innovation and invention success stories. Findings, therefore, have considerable policy implications with respect to the role of the judiciary in the enforcement of non-competition agreements.

Suggested Citation

  • Hsini Huang, 2017. "Invisible Constraints: The Relationship among Non-Competition Agreements, Inventor Mobility, and Patent Commercialization," Science and Public Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 341-353.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:scippl:v:44:y:2017:i:3:p:341-353.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/scipol/scw067
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Manuel Trajtenberg & Gil Shiff & Ran Melamed, 2009. "The "Names Game": Harnessing Inventors, Patent Data for Economic Research," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 93-94, pages 67-77.
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    5. Dirk Fornahl & Christian Zellner & David B. Audretsch (ed.), 2005. "The Role of Labour Mobility and Informal Networks for Knowledge Transfer," International Studies in Entrepreneurship, Springer, number 978-0-387-23140-2, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Shu-Hao Chang, 2024. "International Technology Market Hotspots and Development Trends from the Perspective of Inventor Mobility," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 15(1), pages 2361-2382, March.
    2. Karaulova, Maria & Kroll, Henning & Garcia Chavez, Cecilia & Berghäuser, Hendrik, 2024. "Researcher mobility and cooperation in the science system," Studien zum deutschen Innovationssystem 9-2024, Expertenkommission Forschung und Innovation (EFI) - Commission of Experts for Research and Innovation, Berlin.

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