IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/rfinst/v32y2019i4p1416-1456..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Riding the Bubble with Convex Incentives

Author

Listed:
  • Juan Sotes-Paladino
  • Fernando Zapatero

Abstract

We show that benchmark-linked convex incentives can lead risk-averse money managers aware of mispricing to overinvest in overpriced securities. In the model, the managers’ risk-seeking behavior varies in response to the interaction of mispricing with convexity and benchmarking concerns. Convexity effects can exacerbate the manager’s overinvestment in overvalued nonbenchmark securities. In contrast, they potentially offset the benchmarking effects studied in the literature, leading to underinvestment in overpriced benchmark securities. Under correlated mispricing across assets, our model rationalizes positive positions in nonbenchmark, negative risk premium (i.e., “bubble”) securities and “pairs trading” in two overvalued securities. Our findings help explain several empirical puzzles.Received July 2, 2016; editorial decision April 28, 2018 by Editor Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Sotes-Paladino & Fernando Zapatero, 2019. "Riding the Bubble with Convex Incentives," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(4), pages 1416-1456.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:32:y:2019:i:4:p:1416-1456.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhy074
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Basak, Suleyman & Makarov, Dmitry & Shapiro, Alex & Subrahmanyam, Marti, 2020. "Security design with status concerns," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
    2. Buffa, Andrea M. & Hodor, Idan, 2023. "Institutional investors, heterogeneous benchmarks and the comovement of asset prices," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(2), pages 352-381.
    3. Annalisa Fabretti & Tommy Gärling & Stefano Herzel & Martin Holmen, 2017. "Convex incentives in financial markets: an agent-based analysis," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 40(1), pages 375-395, November.
    4. Sheng, Jiliang & Xu, Si & An, Yunbi & Yang, Jun, 2022. "Dynamic asset pricing in delegated investment: An investigation from the perspective of heterogeneous beliefs of institutional and retail investors," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    5. Hervé Roche & Juan Sotes-Paladino, 2022. "Sentiment, Mispricing and Excess Volatility in Presence of Institutional Investors," Working Papers 205, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    6. Idan Hodor & Andrea Buffa, 2017. "Institutional Investors, Heterogeneous Benchmarks and the Comovement of Asset Prices," 2017 Meeting Papers 374, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:32:y:2019:i:4:p:1416-1456.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sfsssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.