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The Costs of Closing Failed Banks: A Structural Estimation of Regulatory Incentives

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  • Ari Kang
  • Richard Lowery
  • Malcolm Wardlaw

Abstract

We estimate a dynamic model of the decision to close a troubled bank. Regulators trade off an aversion to closing banks against the risk that allowing a bank to continue will raise the eventual costs to the deposit insurance fund. Using a conditional choice probability approach, we estimate the costs associated with closing banks, both in direct costs to the insurance fund and in other costs perceived by regulators, either social or personal. We find that delayed closures were driven by a desire to defer costs, an aversion to closing the largest and smallest troubled banks, and political influence.

Suggested Citation

  • Ari Kang & Richard Lowery & Malcolm Wardlaw, 2015. "The Costs of Closing Failed Banks: A Structural Estimation of Regulatory Incentives," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 28(4), pages 1060-1102.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:28:y:2015:i:4:p:1060-1102.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhu076
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    1. repec:zbw:bofitp:2019_006 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Ajay Subramanian & Baozhong Yang, 2020. "Dynamic Prudential Regulation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(7), pages 3183-3210, July.
    3. Mikhail Mamonov & Anna Pestova & Steven Ongena, 2023. "'Crime and Punishment'? How Banks Anticipate and Propagate Global Financial Sanctions," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 23-59, Swiss Finance Institute.
    4. Lamont K. Black & Ioannis Floros & Rajdeep Sengupta, 2016. "Raising capital when the going gets tough: U.S. bank equity issuance from 2001 to 2014," Research Working Paper RWP 16-5, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    5. Jin, Yi & Gao, Xin & Li, Donghui, 2022. "The effect of individualism on bank risk and bank Performance: An international study," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    6. Amit Ghosh & Salvador Contreras, 2022. "Local Banking Market Frictions and Youth Crime: Evidence from Bank Failures," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 43-75, February.
    7. Reint Gropp & Steven Ongena & Jörg Rocholl & Vahid Saadi, 2022. "The cleansing effect of banking crises," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(3), pages 1186-1213, July.
    8. Kostrov, Alexander & Mamonov, Mikhail, 2019. "The formation of hidden negative capital in banking : A product mismatch hypothesis," BOFIT Discussion Papers 6/2019, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    9. Salvador Contreras & Manthos D. Delis & Amit Ghosh & Iftekhar Hasan, 2022. "Bank failures, local business dynamics, and government policy," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 58(4), pages 1823-1851, April.
    10. Igan, Deniz & Lambert, Thomas & Wagner, Wolf & Zhang, Eden Quxian, 2022. "Winning connections? Special interests and the sale of failed banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    11. Thomas Lambert & Wolf Wagner & Eden Quxian Zhang, 2023. "Banks, Political Capital, and Growth," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(3), pages 613-655.
    12. Carboni, Marika & Fiordelisi, Franco & Trinugroho, Irwan, 2023. "Do investors like political connections?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    13. Karolis Liaudinskas & Kristina Grigaitė, 2021. "Estimating firms’ bank-switching costs," Working Paper 2021/4, Norges Bank.
    14. Jason Allen & Robert Clark & Brent Hickman & Eric Richert, 2019. "Resolving Failed Banks: Uncertainty, Multiple Bidding & Auction Design," Staff Working Papers 19-30, Bank of Canada.
    15. Mikhail Mamonov, 2018. "Bank's Hidden Negative Capital Before and After the Senior Management Change at the Bank of Russia," Russian Journal of Money and Finance, Bank of Russia, vol. 77(1), pages 51-70, March.
    16. Elena Carletti & Giovanni Dell’Ariccia & Robert Marquez, 2021. "Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(1), pages 455-470, January.
    17. M. Mamonov., 2017. "Hidden "holes" in the capital of not yet failed banks in Russia: An estimate of the scope of potential losses," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 7.
    18. Wagner, Wolf & Lambert, Thomas & Zhang, Eden Quxian, 2020. "Banks, Political Capital, and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 15612, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Mikhail Mamonov, 2023. "Measuring Fraud in Banking and its Impact on the Economy: A Quasi-Natural Experiment," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp755, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    20. Luisa Blanco & Salvador Contreras & Amit Ghosh, 2022. "Impact of Great Recession bank failures on use of financial services among racial/ethnic and income groups," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 88(4), pages 1574-1598, April.
    21. Mamonov, Mikhail (Мамонов, Михаил), 2017. "«Holes» in the Capital of Failed Russian Banks: Old Indicators and New Hypotheses [«Дыры» В Капитале Обанкротившихся Российских Банков: Старые Факторы И Новые Гипотезы]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 166-199, February.
    22. Contreras, Salvador & Ghosh, Amit & Hasan, Iftekhar, 2023. "The effect of bank failures on small business loans and income inequality," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).

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