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Do investors like political connections?

Author

Listed:
  • Carboni, Marika
  • Fiordelisi, Franco
  • Trinugroho, Irwan

Abstract

Do investors like political connections? We estimate market reaction after the 2010 US Supreme Court decision, which allowed firms to establish a new form of political connection. We document a positive reaction, especially for highly regulated firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Carboni, Marika & Fiordelisi, Franco & Trinugroho, Irwan, 2023. "Do investors like political connections?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:222:y:2023:i:c:s0165176522004177
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110943
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Albuquerque, Rui & Lei, Zicheng & Rocholl, Jörg & Zhang, Chendi, 2020. "Citizens United vs. FEC and corporate political activism," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Industry-level regulation; Political connections; Citizens united v. FEC; SpeechNow.org. v. FEC;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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