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Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules

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  • Ernst Maug
  • Kristian Rydqvist

Abstract

We analyze how shareholders screen management proposals at annual general meetings. First, we use a simple model of strategic voting to develop a theoretical benchmark of effective information aggregation through voting. Then, we derive testable implications and provide structural estimates of the model parameters. The main conclusions are that shareholders vote strategically and that proposal screening increases value. Shareholders largely neutralize the lock-in effect of supermajority rules, thereby preventing the incorrect rejection of proposals. Copyright 2009, Oxford University Press.

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  • Ernst Maug & Kristian Rydqvist, 2009. "Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 13(1), pages 47-79.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:13:y:2009:i:1:p:47-79
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rof/rfn026
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    Cited by:

    1. Vicente Cuñat & Mireia Giné & Maria Guadalupe, 2016. "Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 20(5), pages 1799-1834.
    2. Berno Buechel & Lydia Mechtenberg & Alexander F. Wagner, 2022. "When do proxy advisors improve corporate decisions?," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 22-47, Swiss Finance Institute.
    3. Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Chen & Duane J. Seppi & Chester S. Spatt, 2009. "The Role of Advisory Services in Proxy Voting," NBER Working Papers 15143, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Patricia Charléty & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2017. "Quorum Rules and Shareholder Power," EconomiX Working Papers 2017-35, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    5. Dressler, Efrat, 2020. "Voice and power: Do institutional shareholders make use of their voting power?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    6. Youzong Xu, 2019. "Collective decision-making of voters with heterogeneous levels of rationality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 267-287, January.
    7. Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2022. "Activism and Takeovers," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(4), pages 1868-1896.
    8. Doron Levit & Nadya Malenko & Ernst Maug, 2024. "Trading and Shareholder Democracy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 79(1), pages 257-304, February.
    9. Malenko, Nadya & Levit, Doron & Maug, Ernst, 2021. "The voting premium," CEPR Discussion Papers 15718, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Karpov, A., 2012. "Corporate Board Elections and Company's Performance," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 10-25.
    11. Bar-Isaac, Heski & Shapiro, Joel, 2020. "Blockholder voting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(3), pages 695-717.
    12. Fortin, Steve & Subramaniam, Chandra & Wang, Xu (Frank) & Zhang, Sanjian (Bill), 2014. "Incentive alignment through performance-focused shareholder proposals on management compensation," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 130-147.
    13. Efrat Dressler & Yevgeny Mugerman, 2023. "Doing the Right Thing? The Voting Power Effect and Institutional Shareholder Voting," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 183(4), pages 1089-1112, April.
    14. Patricia Charléty & Marie-Cécile Fagart & Saïd Souam, 2017. "Quorum Rules and Shareholder Power," Working Papers hal-04141634, HAL.
    15. Laurent Bouton & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Antonin Macé & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation," NBER Working Papers 29005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Vicente Cuñat & Mireia Giné & Maria Guadalupe, 2020. "Price and Probability: Decomposing the Takeover Effects of Anti‐Takeover Provisions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(5), pages 2591-2629, October.
    17. Meirowitz, Adam & Pi, Shaoting, 2022. "Voting and trading: The shareholder’s dilemma," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 1073-1096.
    18. André Schmidt, 2017. "Determinants of Corporate Voting – Evidence from a Large Survey of German Retail Investors," Schmalenbach Business Review, Springer;Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft, vol. 18(1), pages 71-103, February.
    19. Laurent Bouton & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Antonin Macé & Adam Meirowitz & Shaoting Pi & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2024. "Public Information as a Source of Disagreement," PSE Working Papers halshs-04075483, HAL.
    20. Bodnaruk, Andriy & Rossi, Marco, 2016. "Dual ownership, returns, and voting in mergers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(1), pages 58-80.
    21. Van Wesep, Edward D., 2014. "The Idealized Electoral College voting mechanism and shareholder power," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 90-108.
    22. Marquardt, Blair B. & Myers, Brett W. & Niu, Xu, 2018. "Strategic voting and insider ownership," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 50-71.
    23. Li, Yuanzhi & Yermack, David, 2016. "Evasive shareholder meetings," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 318-334.
    24. David Yermack & Yuanzhi Li, 2014. "Evasive Shareholder Meetings," NBER Working Papers 19991, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    25. Brav, Alon & Cain, Matthew & Zytnick, Jonathon, 2022. "Retail shareholder participation in the proxy process: Monitoring, engagement, and voting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 492-522.

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