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Economics and Prescribed Fire Law in the United States

Author

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  • Jonathan Yoder
  • Marcia Tilley
  • David Engle
  • Samuel Fuhlendorf

Abstract

Prescribed burning is increasingly recognized as a useful but risky land management and conservation tool. Common law relating to prescribed fire is generally predicated on negligence rules. However, virtually all states also have statutory law specifying liability rules or criminal penalties for prescribed burning, and the laws in many states have been changing substantially in recent years. We develop an economic model of the incentive and welfare effects of prescribed burning, where both the burner and potential victims of escaped fires can reduce expected damage with precautionary effort. The model provides implications regarding the comparative advantages of strict liability versus negligence rules. We then examine the characteristics and geographic distribution of prescribed fire liability law in the United States in the context of the model. Specifically, we discuss possible economic underpinnings of the recent emergence of statutes in southeastern states that are more supportive of prescribed fire use, despite its associated risks.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Yoder & Marcia Tilley & David Engle & Samuel Fuhlendorf, 2003. "Economics and Prescribed Fire Law in the United States," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 25(1), pages 218-233.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:revage:v:25:y:2003:i:1:p:218-233.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1467-9353.00055
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kolstad, Charles D & Ulen, Thomas S & Johnson, Gary V, 1990. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 888-901, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Langpap & JunJie Wu, 2021. "Preemptive Incentives and Liability Rules for Wildfire Risk Management," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 103(5), pages 1783-1801, October.
    2. Regmi, Arun & Kreye, Melissa M. & Kreye, Jesse K., 2023. "Forest landowner demand for prescribed fire as an ecological management tool in Pennsylvania, USA," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    3. Jonathan Yoder & Marian Lankoande, 2005. "Firefights and Fuel Management: A Nested Rotation Model for Wildfire Risk Mitigation," Working Papers 2005-7, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
    4. Autumn S. Clark & Devan Allen McGranahan & Benjamin A. Geaumont & Carissa L. Wonkka & Jacqueline P. Ott & Urs P. Kreuter, 2022. "Barriers to Prescribed Fire in the US Great Plains, Part II: Critical Review of Presently Used and Potentially Expandable Solutions," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(9), pages 1-13, September.
    5. Alissa Hinojosa & Urs P. Kreuter & Carissa L. Wonkka, 2020. "Liability and the Use of Prescribed Fire in the Southern Plains, USA: A Survey of District Court Judges," Land, MDPI, vol. 9(9), pages 1-12, September.
    6. Autumn S. Clark & Devan Allen McGranahan & Benjamin A. Geaumont & Carissa L. Wonkka & Jacqueline P. Ott & Urs P. Kreuter, 2022. "Barriers to Prescribed Fire in the US Great Plains, Part I: Systematic Review of Socio-Ecological Research," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(9), pages 1-16, September.
    7. Sun, Changyou, 2006. "State statutory reforms and retention of prescribed fire liability laws on U.S. forest land," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 392-402, December.
    8. Eliott, Martyn G. & Venn, Tyron J. & Lewis, Tom & Farrar, Michael & Srivastava, Sanjeev K., 2021. "A prescribed fire cost model for public lands in south-east Queensland," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).

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