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How Efficient are Decentralized Auction Platforms?

Author

Listed:
  • Aaron L Bodoh-Creed
  • Jörn Boehnke
  • Brent Hickman

Abstract

We model a decentralized, dynamic auction market platform in which a continuum of buyers and sellers participate in simultaneous, single-unit auctions each period. Our model accounts for the endogenous entry of agents and the impact of intertemporal optimization on bids. We estimate the structural primitives of our model using Kindle sales on eBay. We find that just over one-third of Kindle auctions on eBay result in an inefficient allocation with deadweight loss amounting to 14% of total possible market surplus. We also find that partial centralization—for example, running half as many 2-unit, uniform-price auctions each day—would eliminate a large fraction of the inefficiency, but yield lower seller revenues. Our results also highlight the importance of understanding platform composition effects—selection of agents into the market—in assessing the implications of market redesign. We also prove that the equilibrium of our model with a continuum of buyers and sellers is an approximate equilibrium of the analogous model with a finite number of agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Aaron L Bodoh-Creed & Jörn Boehnke & Brent Hickman, 2021. "How Efficient are Decentralized Auction Platforms?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(1), pages 91-125.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:88:y:2021:i:1:p:91-125.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdaa017
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Caio Waisman, 2021. "Selling mechanisms for perishable goods: An empirical analysis of an online resale market for event tickets," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 127-178, June.
    2. Alberto Bracci & Jorn Boehnke & Abeer ElBahrawy & Nicola Perra & Alexander Teytelboym & Andrea Baronchelli, 2021. "Macroscopic properties of buyer-seller networks in online marketplaces," Papers 2112.09065, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
    3. Dominic Coey & Bradley J. Larsen & Kane Sweeney & Caio Waisman, 2021. "Scalable Optimal Online Auctions," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(4), pages 593-618, July.

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