Identifying and Testing Models of Managerial Compensation
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- George-Levi Gayle & Robert Miller, "undated". "Identifying and Testing Models of Managerial Compensations," GSIA Working Papers 2009-E7, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Stephen Terry & Anastasia Zakolyukina & Toni Whited, 2018. "Information Distortion, R&D, and Growth," 2018 Meeting Papers 217, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Taylor, Lucian A., 2013. "CEO wage dynamics: Estimates from a learning model," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 79-98.
- George-Levi Gayle & Chen Li & Robert A. Miller, 2015. "Was Sarbanes-Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation," Working Papers 2015-17, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Hu, Yingyao & Xin, Yi, 2024. "Identification and estimation of dynamic structural models with unobserved choices," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 242(2).
- Lamy, Laurent & Patnam, Manasa & Visser, Michael, 2023.
"Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts,"
Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 235(2), pages 1172-1202.
- Laurent LAMY & Manasa PATNAM & Michael VISSER, 2019. "Distinguishing Incentive from Selection Effects in Auction-Determined Contracts," Working Papers 2019-15, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Laurent Lamy & Manasa Patnam & Michael Visser, 2023. "Distinguishing Incentive from Selection Effects in Auction-Determined Contracts," Post-Print hal-03924664, HAL.
- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016.
"Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
- Gabaix, Xavier & Edmans, Alex, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," CEPR Discussion Papers 10566, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Scholarly Articles 34651704, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," NBER Working Papers 21131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nur Kaynar & Auyon Siddiq, 2023. "Estimating Effects of Incentive Contracts in Online Labor Platforms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(4), pages 2106-2126, April.
- Loyola, Gino & Portilla, Yolanda, 2020. "Managerial compensation as a double-edged sword: Optimal incentives under misreporting," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 994-1017.
- Stephen J. Terry & Toni M. Whited & Anastasia A. Zakolyukina, 2020.
"Information versus Investment,"
Working Papers
2020-110, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
- Stephen J. Terry & Toni M. Whited & Anastasia A. Zakolyukina, 2022. "Information versus Investment," NBER Working Papers 29636, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- George-Levi Gayle & Robert A. Miller, 2009.
"Has Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation?,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1740-1769, December.
- George-Levi Gayle & Robert A. Miller, 2005. "Has Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation?," GSIA Working Papers 2005-E58, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Braz Camargo & Elena Pastorino & Fabian Lange, 2018. "Earnings Dynamics: the Role of Learning, Human Capital, and Performance Incentives," 2018 Meeting Papers 581, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- George‐Levi Gayle & Chen Li & Robert A. Miller, 2022. "Was Sarbanes–Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 1189-1234, September.
- Gaurab Aryal & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2011.
"Identification of Insurance Models with Multidimensional Screening,"
ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics
2011-538, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- Gaurab Aryal & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2015. "Identification of Insurance Models with Multidimensional Screening," Papers 1508.02919, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2016.
- Anastasia A. Zakolyukina, 2018. "How Common Are Intentional GAAP Violations? Estimates from a Dynamic Model," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(1), pages 5-44, March.
- Jean-Louis Bago & Bruce Shearer, 2022. "Risk preferences and contract choices," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(5), pages 1374-1398, November.
- Page, T. Beau, 2018. "CEO attributes, compensation, and firm value: Evidence from a structural estimation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(2), pages 378-401.
- George-Levi Gayle & Limor Golan & Robert A. Miller, 2015. "Interlocked Executives and Insider Board Members: An Empirical Analysis," Working Papers 2015-40, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Gaurab Aryal & Federico Zincenko, 2014. "Identification and Estimation of Multidimensional Screening," Papers 1411.6250, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
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