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Bargaining and Sharing Innovative Knowledge

Author

Listed:
  • Claude d'Aspremont
  • Sudipto Bhattacharya
  • Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet

Abstract

We consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interim research knowledge between two participants in an R&D race for an ultimate, patentable invention. Licence fee schedules that are functions of the "amount of knowledge disclosed" by the leading to the lagging agent, are examined for their abilities to attain efficient outcomes and varying shares of the surplus arising from disclosure. In her sequential-offers bargaining games, the uninformed buyer is able to elicit full disclosures without sharing the incremental surplus with any type of the licensor, and thus do as well as a perfectly informed and discriminating knowledge licensee.

Suggested Citation

  • Claude d'Aspremont & Sudipto Bhattacharya & Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet, 2000. "Bargaining and Sharing Innovative Knowledge," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(2), pages 255-271.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:67:y:2000:i:2:p:255-271.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1467-937X.00130
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    Cited by:

    1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 859-870, May.
    2. Emanuele Bacchiega & Paolo Garella, 2006. "Disclosing vs. Withholding Technology Knowledge in a Duopoly," Working Papers 0609, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    3. Ponce, Carlos J., 2011. "Knowledge disclosure as intellectual property rights protection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 418-434.
    4. Damiano Silipo, 2005. "The Evolution of Cooperation in Patent Races:Theory and Experimental Evidence," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 85(1), pages 1-38, July.
    5. Cary Deck & Erik O. Kimbrough, 2017. "Experimenting with Contests for Experimentation," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(2), pages 391-406, October.
    6. Sudipto Bhattacharya & Sergei Guriev, 2006. "Patents vs. Trade Secrets: Knowledge Licensing and Spillover," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(6), pages 1112-1147, December.
    7. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/3jesolrqda8pl9qj4osla4hevt is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Scott Baker & Pak Yee Lee & Claudio Mezzetti, 2011. "Intellectual property disclosure as threat," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 7(1), pages 21-38, March.
    9. Chiara Conti & Marco A. Marini, 2019. "Are you the right partner? R&D agreement as a screening device," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(3), pages 243-264, April.
    10. Amir, Rabah & Evstigneev, Igor & Wooders, John, 2003. "Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 183-207, February.
    11. Mathis, Jérôme, 2008. "Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 571-584, November.
    12. Chiara CONTI, 2013. "Asymmetric information in a duopoly with spillovers: new findings on the effects of RJVs," Departmental Working Papers 2013-04, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    13. Trommetter, M. & Tropéano, J.P., 2009. "Do broad patents deter research cooperation ?," Working Papers 200904, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
    14. Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005. "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November.
    15. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Guriev, Sergei, 2004. "Knowledge Disclosure, Patents and Optimal Organization of Research and Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 4513, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Gabriella Chiesa, 2005. "Information Sharing And Optimum Financing Mode," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 73(1), pages 50-74, January.
    17. Kaustav Das, 2013. "Strategic Experimentation with Heterogeneous Agents and Payoff Externalities," Discussion Papers 1315, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    18. Glode, Vincent & Green, Richard C., 2011. "Information spillovers and performance persistence for hedge funds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(1), pages 1-17, July.
    19. Kwiatkowski, Andrzej, 2010. "Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-87, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    20. Nisvan Erkal & Deborah Minehart, 2007. "Optimal Sharing Strategies in Dynamic Games of Research and Development," EAG Discussions Papers 200707, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    21. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/3jesolrqda8pl9qj4osla4hevt is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Miller, David A., 2008. "Invention under uncertainty and the threat of ex post entry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 387-412, April.
    23. Nisvan Erkal & Deborah Minehart, 2013. "Optimal Sharing Strategies in Dynamic," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1174, The University of Melbourne.

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