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The Demand for (Differentiated) Information

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  • Beth Allen

Abstract

A framework for distinguishing between the quantity of information and its quality or type is presented in which information is an indivisible differentiated commodity for which satiation occurs at one unit. Uncountably many types of information are possible which can be costlessly combined by agents. Similarity of information is expressed by a metric which reflects substitution possibilities among different information structures. In the model, traders desire information only because it helps them to maximize state dependent utilities under uncertainty. Then the individual demand for information is well defined, but possibly nonconvex valued because of the indivisibilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Beth Allen, 1986. "The Demand for (Differentiated) Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(3), pages 311-323.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:53:y:1986:i:3:p:311-323.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2297631
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    Cited by:

    1. Qihong Liu Konstantinos Serfes, 2001. "Endogenous Acquisition Of Information On Consumer Willingness To Pay In A Product Differentiated Duopoly," Industrial Organization 0110001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Antonio Jimenez-Martinez, 2007. "Strategic Information Acquisition in Networked Groups with "Informational Spillovers"," Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers EC200801, Universidad de Guanajuato, Department of Economics and Finance, revised Oct 2008.
    3. Khan, M. Ali & Sun, Yeneng & Tourky, Rabee & Zhang, Zhixiang, 2008. "Similarity of differential information with subjective prior beliefs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(9-10), pages 1024-1039, September.
    4. Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2011. "Coordination Incentives for Information Acquisition with a Finite Set of Players," Working Papers DTE 497, CIDE, División de Economía.
    5. Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2009. "Strategic Information Acquisition in Networked Groups with 'Informational Spillovers' Abstract: This paper develops a model of costly information acquisition by agents who are connected through a netw," Working Papers DTE 470, CIDE, División de Economía.
    6. Áron Tóbiás, 2023. "Cognitive limits and preferences for information," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 46(1), pages 221-253, June.

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