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When Does Higher Firm Leverage Lead to Higher Employee Pay?

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Listed:
  • Timothy E Dore
  • Rebecca Zarutskie

Abstract

We show that newly hired workers earn higher wages in response to higher firm leverage. Consistent with compensating differential models, these higher wages appear to reflect compensation for the risk of earnings losses in the event of financial distress. For tenured workers, increases in leverage are not associated with higher wages. Our findings suggest that the wage costs of debt and optimal capital structure for a firm depend on expected employee turnover, as well as on the firm’s future growth and hiring plans. Variation in local labor market conditions also significantly affects the relationship between firm leverage and employee pay. (JEL G32, G33, J21, J31, J61)Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Suggested Citation

  • Timothy E Dore & Rebecca Zarutskie, 2023. "When Does Higher Firm Leverage Lead to Higher Employee Pay?," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(1), pages 36-77.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rcorpf:v:12:y:2023:i:1:p:36-77.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rcfs/cfac032
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gill, Balbinder Singh & Choi, Jongmoo Jay & John, Kose, 2024. "Firm leverage and employee pay: The moderating role of CEO leadership style," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 95(PA).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers

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