IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/qjecon/v84y1970i4p705-709..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Note on Zeckhauser's "Majority Rule with Lotteries on Alternatives": The Case of the Paradox of Voting

Author

Listed:
  • Kenneth A. Shepsle

Abstract

I. Introductory remarks, 705. — II. The paradox of voting under uncertainty: a special case, 706. — III. The unconstrained case and the importance of strategy constraints, 708.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenneth A. Shepsle, 1970. "A Note on Zeckhauser's "Majority Rule with Lotteries on Alternatives": The Case of the Paradox of Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(4), pages 705-709.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:84:y:1970:i:4:p:705-709.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1880854
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Burkhard Schipper & Hee Yeul Woo, 2012. "Political Awareness and Microtargeting of Voters in Electoral Competition," Working Papers 124, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    2. Richard McKelvey, 1980. "Ambiguity in spatial models of policy formation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 385-402, January.
    3. Christian Roessler & Sandro Shelegia & Bruno Strulovici, 2018. "Collective Commitment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(1), pages 347-380.
    4. Schipper, Burkhard C. & Woo, Hee Yeul, 2019. "Political Awareness, Microtargeting of Voters, and Negative Electoral Campaigning," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 14(1), pages 41-88, January.
    5. Christian Roessler & Sandro Shelegia & Bruno Strulovici, 2013. "The Roman Metro Problem: Dynamic Voting and the Limited Power of Commitment," Discussion Papers 1560, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Roberti, Paolo, 2019. "Citizens or lobbies: Who controls policy?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 497-514.
    7. Burkhard Schipper & Hee Yeul Woo, 2014. "Political Awareness, Microtargeting of Voters, and Negative Electoral Campaigning," Working Papers 148, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    8. Burkhard Schipper & Hee Yeul Woo, 2012. "Political Awareness and Microtargeting of Voters in Electoral Competition," Working Papers 46, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    9. Christian Roessler & Sandro Shelegia & Bruno Strulovici, 2018. "Collective Commitment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(1), pages 347-380.
    10. D Austen-Smith, 1983. "The Spatial Theory of Electoral Competition: Instability, Institutions, and Information," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 1(4), pages 439-460, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:84:y:1970:i:4:p:705-709.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/qje .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.