Executive Compensation Payments by Large and Small Industrial Companies
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Cited by:
- Alexandre Mas, 2016.
"Does Disclosure affect CEO Pay Setting? Evidence from the Passage of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act,"
Working Papers
2016-5, Princeton University. Economics Department..
- Alexandre Mas, 2019. "Does Disclosure affect CEO Pay Setting? Evidence from the Passage of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act," Working Papers 632, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Brian Bell & Simone Pedemonte & John Van Reenen, 2021.
"Ceo Pay and the Rise of Relative Performance Contracts: A Question of Governance?,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(5), pages 2513-2542.
- Bell, Brian & Van Reenen, John, 2016. "CEO pay and the rise of relative performance contracts:a question of governance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67674, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Bell, Brian & Pedemonte, Simone & Van Reenen, John, 2021. "CEO pay and the rise of relative performance contracts: a question of governance?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112749, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Brian Bell & John Van Reenen, 2016. "CEO Pay and the rise of Relative Performance Contracts: A Question of Governance?," NBER Working Papers 22407, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Van Reenen, John & Bell, Brian, 2016. "Ceo Pay And The Rise Of Relative Performance Contracts: A Question Of Governance?," CEPR Discussion Papers 11385, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Brian Bell & Simone Pedemonte & John Van Reenen, 2016. "CEO pay and the rise of relative performance contracts: a question of governance?," CEP Discussion Papers dp1439, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Lambrecht, Bart M. & Myers, Stewart C., 2008. "Debt and managerial rents in a real-options model of the firm," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 209-231, August.
- Salvatore Morelli, 2018.
"Banking crises in the US: the response of top income shares in a historical perspective,"
The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 16(2), pages 257-294, June.
- Salvatore Morelli, 2018. "Banking crises in the US: the response of top income shares in a historical perspective," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 16(2), pages 257-294, June.
- Salvatore Morelli, 2014. "Banking Crises in the US: the Response of Top Income Shares in a Historical Perspective," CSEF Working Papers 359, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
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