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The Sherman ActIts Design and Its Effects

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  • Myron W. Watkins

Abstract

Purpose of Sherman Act, — Diverse interests affected, 5. — I. Producer interests: indirectly protected by (a) raising standards of managerial responsibility, (b) affording various classes of producers the opportunity for prudential cooperation, 8. — Inadequacy of security afforded producers under Sherman Act, 14. — II. Interests of potential producers, 15; directly protected against (a) predatory methods of competition, 19, (b) trade boycotts, 20, (c) labor conspiracies to restrict sales and employer combinations to blacklist, 21. — Evidence of rigorous effectiveness of Sherman Act in safeguarding freedom of enterprise, 21. — III. Consumer interests: directly protected by penalization of concerted efforts to curtail supply or raise prices, (a) Trade agreements for these objects absolutely illegal, 24, but trade coöperation to control conditions of competition not hindered, 26. (b) Corporate mergers, originally held beyond the reach of the law, were later, so it appeared, absolutely condemned, 31. Present interpretation more liberal, 36. — Is there justification for a legal distinction between business mergers and associations? 38. — IV. Conclusion, that experience has vindicated the general policy of the Sherman Act, 39. — Contrast with British experience, 40. — Direction in which anti-trust laws need to be supplemented, 43.

Suggested Citation

  • Myron W. Watkins, 1928. "The Sherman ActIts Design and Its Effects," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 43(1), pages 1-43.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:43:y:1928:i:1:p:1-43.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1883940
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    Cited by:

    1. Thierry Kirat & Frédéric Marty, 2020. "The Late Emerging Consensus Among American Economists on Antitrust Laws in the Second New Deal (1935-1941) (Revised Version)," CIRANO Working Papers 2020s-46, CIRANO.
    2. Thierry Kirat & Frédéric Marty, 2021. "The late emerging consensus among American economists on antitrust laws in the 2nd New Deal (1935-1941)," Post-Print halshs-03261721, HAL.
    3. Thierry Kirat & Frédéric Marty, 2019. "The Late Emerging Consensus Among American Economists on Antitrust Laws in the Second New Deal," CIRANO Working Papers 2019s-12, CIRANO.

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