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Monopolistic Competition, Risk Aversion, and Equilibrium Recessions

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  • Jeff Frank

Abstract

This paper considers a model with monopolistic competition and multiple equilibria, rankable by output, employment, and the Pareto criterion. While papers in the literature assume a linear production technology and derive a continuum of equilibria, we assume a standard diminishing returns production function and find a finite set of equilibria. Our new feature is the assumption that firms behave in a risk-averse manner. A low-level equilibrium is sustainable because firms, at the low profits level associated with the equilibrium, become extremely cautious in their employment decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeff Frank, 1990. "Monopolistic Competition, Risk Aversion, and Equilibrium Recessions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(4), pages 921-938.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:105:y:1990:i:4:p:921-938.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2937879
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    Cited by:

    1. Danyang Xie, 2000. "Power Risk Aversion Utility Functions," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 1(2), pages 265-282, November.
    2. Weinrich, Gerd, 1997. "Endogenous Fixprices and Sticky Price Adjustment of Risk-averse Firms," MPRA Paper 6302, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Ali Choudhary & Paul Levine, 2003. "Self-Stabilizing Firms and Unemployment Persistence," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0303, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
    4. Dariel, Aurelie & Riedl, Arno & Siegenthaler, Simon, 2021. "Referral hiring and wage formation in a market with adverse selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 109-130.
    5. Tam'as Fleiner & Zsuzsanna Jank'o & Akihisa Tamura & Alexander Teytelboym, 2015. "Trading Networks with Bilateral Contracts," Papers 1510.01210, arXiv.org, revised May 2018.

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