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Third-Party Federalism: Using Local Governments (and Their Contractors) to Implement National Policy

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  • Jessica Terman
  • Richard Feiock

Abstract

The federal government relies on states and localities to implement federal policy. The Department of Energy’s Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program is one case in point. As a part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), over $3.2 billion was directed to local government energy efficiency and sustainability efforts. However, local governments have struggled to achieve timely implementation—one of the key goals of the program as specified by the federal government. We find that using contractors and the complications associated with using these third-party implementers influenced achievement of this federal goal. The insights for intergovernmental grant implementation derived from this analysis provide a foundation for integrating the fiscal federalism and contracting literatures into a broader theory of third-party federalism.

Suggested Citation

  • Jessica Terman & Richard Feiock, 2015. "Third-Party Federalism: Using Local Governments (and Their Contractors) to Implement National Policy," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 45(2), pages 322-349.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:publus:v:45:y:2015:i:2:p:322-349.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/publius/pju041
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    1. Chubb, John E., 1985. "The Political Economy of Federalism," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(4), pages 994-1015, December.
    2. Wallace E. Oates & Wallace E. Oates, 2004. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 22, pages 384-414, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Craig Volden, 2007. "Intergovernmental Grants: A Formal Model of Interrelated National and Subnational Political Decisions," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 37(2), pages 209-243, Spring.
    4. Sean Nicholson-Crotty, 2012. "Leaving Money on the Table: Learning from Recent Refusals of Federal Grants in the American States," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 42(3), pages 449-466, July.
    5. Becker, Elizabeth, 1996. "The Illusion of Fiscal Illusion: Unsticking the Flypaper Effect," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 86(1-2), pages 85-102, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hugo J. Fuentes & Gustavo Mendoza & Miguel A. Montoya & Ismael Aguilar, 2021. "Public-private partnerships in Mexico: Challenges and opportunities at local level," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, , vol. 22(1), pages 35-52, March.
    2. Hyunjung Ji & Mark Patrick Tate, 2021. "Spillover effects of central cities on sustainability efforts in a metropolitan area," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 54(1), pages 95-121, March.
    3. NakHyeok Choi, 2021. "Analyzing Local Government Capacity and Performance: Implications for Sustainable Development," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(7), pages 1-14, March.

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