IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/publus/v45y2015i1p24-50..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Decentralization and Political Corruption: Disaggregating Regional Authority

Author

Listed:
  • Benjamin Neudorfer
  • Natascha S. Neudorfer

Abstract

In this article, we argue that countries with strong regional self-rule offer more incentives and opportunities to form networks of local collusion leading to higher corruption levels. In contrast, shared rule allows for more oversight on the national level which reduces political corruption. Using a recent dataset on regional authority, we test our hypotheses on a sample of up to thirty-six countries between 1984 and 2006 and find robust empirical support for the predicted contrasting effects of regional authority: Self-rule enhances and shared rule limits political corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Benjamin Neudorfer & Natascha S. Neudorfer, 2015. "Decentralization and Political Corruption: Disaggregating Regional Authority," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 45(1), pages 24-50.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:publus:v:45:y:2015:i:1:p:24-50.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/publius/pju035
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sarah Shair-Rosenfield, 2022. "Decentralization, intergovernmental coordination, and emergency response in East and Southeast Asia: lessons from combatting the COVID-19 pandemic," Working Papers. Collection A: Public economics, governance and decentralization 2209, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:publus:v:45:y:2015:i:1:p:24-50.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/publius .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.