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Claiming Credit in the U.S. Federal System: Testing a Model of Competitive Federalism

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  • Sean Nicholson-Crotty
  • Nick Theobald

Abstract

Based on the assumption that lawmakers can only claim credit for public goods they produce, models of intergovernmental political competition predict that states with less ability to pay for public goods will respond more favorably to the price effect of federal grants. We offer the alternative assumption that confusion over proper credit assignment allows state lawmakers to claim credit for federal production. This produces the expectation that lawmakers in states with low ability to pay will be more likely to let federal money supplant own source spending, assuming that they will be able to continue claiming credit even as their share of production decreases. We test these competing assertions in data on transportation production in the American states between 1971 and 1996. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Sean Nicholson-Crotty & Nick Theobald, 2011. "Claiming Credit in the U.S. Federal System: Testing a Model of Competitive Federalism," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 41(2), pages 232-256, Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:publus:v:41:y:2011:i:2:p:232-256
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/publius/pjq029
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    Cited by:

    1. Yakovlev, Pavel A. & Tosun, Mehmet S. & Lewis, William P., 2018. "The Fiscal Consequences of State Legislative Term Limits," Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association, vol. 48(3), January.
    2. Yakovlev, Pavel & Tosun, Mehmet S. & Lewis, William P., 2012. "Legislative Term Limits and State Aid to Local Governments," IZA Discussion Papers 6456, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Judith I. Stallmann & Steven Deller & Lindsay Amiel & Craig Maher, 2012. "Tax and Expenditure Limitations and State Credit Ratings," Public Finance Review, , vol. 40(5), pages 643-669, September.
    4. Lori Riverstone-Newell, 2017. "The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response to Local Policy Innovation," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 47(3), pages 403-425.
    5. Steven Deller & Craig Maher & Judith Stallmann, 2021. "Do tax and expenditure limitations exacerbate rising income inequality?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 611-643, November.
    6. Steven Deller & Judith I. Stallmann & Lindsay Amiel, 2012. "The Impact of State and Local Tax and Expenditure Limitations on State Economic Growth," Growth and Change, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 56-84, March.
    7. Austin M Aldag & Mildred E Warner & Yunji Kim, 2019. "Leviathan or Public Steward? Evidence on Local Government Taxing Behavior from New York State," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 49(4), pages 671-693.

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