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What Makes Strong Federalism Seem Weak? Fiscal Resources and Presidential-Provincial Relations in Argentina

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  • Allyson L. Benton

Abstract

This article revives an unresolved political debate now masquerading as an empirical puzzle: how can we characterize the nature of Argentine federalism when recent presidential administrations support conflicting conclusions about it? Carlos Saúl Menem (1989-1999) easily pushed through policy changes with the support of governors and provincial delegates in congress, implying that federalism is weak. Fernando De la Rúa (1999-2001) faced considerable provincial and congressional opposition, implying that federalism is strong. To resolve this puzzle, I recast federalism in terms of its economic context. I argue that economic growth renders presidential-provincial relations positive-sum, leading to intergovernmental cooperation and the appearance of weak federalism. Economic decline turns presidential-provincial relations zero-sum, raising intergovernmental conflict, and the appearance of strong federal institutions. Copyright 2009, Oxford University Press.

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  • Allyson L. Benton, 2009. "What Makes Strong Federalism Seem Weak? Fiscal Resources and Presidential-Provincial Relations in Argentina," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 39(4), pages 651-676, Fall.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:publus:v:39:y:2009:i:4:p:651-676
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/publius/pjn032
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    Cited by:

    1. Ardanaz, Martín & Leiras, Marcelo & Tommasi, Mariano, 2012. "The Politics of Federalism in Argentina: Implications for Governance and Accountability," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 3977, Inter-American Development Bank.
    2. Ardanaz, Martín & Leiras, Marcelo & Tommasi, Mariano, 2014. "The Politics of Federalism in Argentina and its Implications for Governance and Accountability," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 26-45.
    3. Freille Sebastián, 2023. "Winner's purse: Presidents and gobernors in Argentina during 2003-2019," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4654, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.

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