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The Assessment: Games and Coordination

Author

Listed:
  • David P. Myatt
  • Hyun Song Shin
  • Chris Wallace

Abstract

Coordination problems arise in a multitude of economic interactions. Recent advances in the field of game theory have shed new light on these problems and the ways in which they might be analysed. This issue of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy first examines some of the theoretical dimensions to this literature, as well as some empirical and experimental insights. It goes on to apply some of these ideas to a number of important policy areas, including macroeconomic policy coordination, public good provision, and problems of political coordination. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • David P. Myatt & Hyun Song Shin & Chris Wallace, 2002. "The Assessment: Games and Coordination," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 18(4), pages 397-417.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:18:y:2002:i:4:p:397-417
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. John Whalley, 2008. "Globalisation and Values," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(11), pages 1503-1524, November.
    2. Dominic Rohner & Bruno Frey, 2007. "Blood and ink! The common-interest-game between terrorists and the media," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 129-145, October.
    3. Abraham Aldama & Mateo Vásquez-Cortés & Lauren Elyssa Young, 2019. "Fear and citizen coordination against dictatorship," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(1), pages 103-125, January.
    4. Arno Riedl & Ingrid M. T. Rohde & Martin Strobel, 2021. "Free Neighborhood Choice Boosts Socially Optimal Outcomes in Stag-Hunt Coordination Problem," CESifo Working Paper Series 9012, CESifo.
    5. Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2006. "The pros and cons of higher transparency: the case of speculative attacks," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 72(3), pages 215-246.
    6. de Martí, Joan & Milán, Pau, 2019. "Regime change in large information networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 262-284.
    7. Cárcamo-Díaz, Rodrigo, 2005. "Foundations of macroeconomic policy coordination: fostering dialogue as a policy tool in Latin America," Macroeconomía del Desarrollo 5404, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    8. David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2005. "The Evolution of Teams," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Natalie Gold (ed.), Teamwork, chapter 4, pages 78-101, Palgrave Macmillan.
    9. Sanchez Villalba, Miguel, 2015. "Global inspection games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 59-72.

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