The Assessment: Games and Coordination
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- John Whalley, 2008.
"Globalisation and Values,"
The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(11), pages 1503-1524, November.
- John Whalley, 2005. "Globalization and Values," CESifo Working Paper Series 1441, CESifo.
- David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2005.
"The Evolution of Teams,"
Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Natalie Gold (ed.), Teamwork, chapter 4, pages 78-101,
Palgrave Macmillan.
- David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2003. "Evolution in Teams," Economics Series Working Papers 177, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Dominic Rohner & Bruno Frey, 2007.
"Blood and ink! The common-interest-game between terrorists and the media,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 129-145, October.
- Bruno S. Frey & Dominik Rohner, 2006. "Blood and Ink! The Common-Interest-GameBetween Terrorists and the Media," IEW - Working Papers 285, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Bruno S. Frey & Dominic Rohner, 2006. "Blood and Ink! The Common-Interest-Game Between Terrorists and the Media," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-08, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Abraham Aldama & Mateo Vásquez-Cortés & Lauren Elyssa Young, 2019. "Fear and citizen coordination against dictatorship," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(1), pages 103-125, January.
- Arno Riedl & Ingrid M. T. Rohde & Martin Strobel, 2021. "Free Neighborhood Choice Boosts Socially Optimal Outcomes in Stag-Hunt Coordination Problem," CESifo Working Paper Series 9012, CESifo.
- de Martí, Joan & Milán, Pau, 2019.
"Regime change in large information networks,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 262-284.
- Joan de Martí & Pau Milán, 2018. "Regime Change in Large Information Networks," Working Papers 1049, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2006.
"The pros and cons of higher transparency: the case of speculative attacks,"
Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 72(3), pages 215-246.
- Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2005. "The Pros and Cons of Higher Transparency: The Case of Speculative Attacks," Working Papers 0502, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2006. "The Pros and Cons of Higher Transparency: The Case of Speculative Attacks," Post-Print halshs-00137469, HAL.
- Jean-Pierre ALLEGRET & Camille CORNAND, 2006. "The pros and cons of higher transparency : the case of speculative attacks," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2006031, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2005. "The Pros and Cons of Higher Transparency: The Case of Speculative Attacks," Post-Print halshs-00180086, HAL.
- Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2005. "The Pros and Cons of Higher Transparency : The Case of Speculative Attacks," Post-Print hal-00279027, HAL.
- Sanchez Villalba, Miguel, 2015. "Global inspection games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 59-72.
- Cárcamo-Díaz, Rodrigo, 2005. "Foundations of macroeconomic policy coordination: fostering dialogue as a policy tool in Latin America," Macroeconomía del Desarrollo 5404, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxford:v:18:y:2002:i:4:p:397-417. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/oxrep .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.