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Announcements as an equilibrium selection device

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  • Nicola Acocella
  • Giovanni Di Bartolomeo
  • Andrew Hughes Hallett
  • Paolo G. Piacquadio

Abstract

We address the coordination failures that arise in models with multiple equilibria and study how they may be resolved by reconsidering the role of cheap talk communication as an equilibrium selection device. We introduce an outside option (representing common-knowledge expected outcomes in the absence of coordination), and show that a player may be forced to make an announcement leading to a sub-optimal outcome with respect to the commitment solution (a binding message) in order to keep the message credible. The main contribution is to show, by means of examples taken from standard macro- and microeconomic decision making problems, how the existing tools of bargaining can be applied to models with multiple equilibria to produce sensible outcomes. The purpose is to provide a formal underpinning for methods that resolve multiple equilibrium problems by exploiting the power of policy announcements. Copyright 2014 Oxford University Press 2013 All rights reserved, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Andrew Hughes Hallett & Paolo G. Piacquadio, 2014. "Announcements as an equilibrium selection device," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 325-347, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:66:y:2014:i:1:p:325-347
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpt002
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    Cited by:

    1. Hughes Hallett Andrew & Nicola Acocella, "undated". "Stabilization and expanded commitment: a theory of forward guidance for economies with rational expectations," Working Papers 132/14, Sapienza University of Rome, Metodi e Modelli per l'Economia, il Territorio e la Finanza MEMOTEF.
    2. Sergey Pekarski, 2017. "Tight Money and the Sustainability of Public Debt," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 13(1), pages 191-223, February.

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