IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/oxecpp/v60y2008i3p546-565.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Voting games and computational complexity

Author

Listed:
  • Glenn W. Harrison
  • Tanga McDaniel

Abstract

Voting rules over three or more alternatives suffer from a general problem of manipulability. However, if the rule is 'difficult' to manipulate, in some formal computational sense that is intrinsic to the rule or some cognitive sense specific to the set of voters, then one might not observe manipulation in practice. We evaluate this hypothesis using controlled laboratory experiments. We conclude that one voting rule, due originally to Condorcet, is indeed behaviorally incentive-compatible despite being theoretically manipulable if the underlying preference environment is sufficiently diverse that voters have difficulty ascertaining others' preferences. Copyright 2008 , Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Glenn W. Harrison & Tanga McDaniel, 2008. "Voting games and computational complexity," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 546-565, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:60:y:2008:i:3:p:546-565
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpm045
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Pintér, Ágnes & Veszteg, Róbert F., 2010. "Minority vs. majority: An experimental study of standardized bids," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 36-50, March.
    2. Cueva, Carlos & Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Iñigo & Mata-Pérez, Esther & Ponti, Giovanni & Sartarelli, Marcello & Yu, Haihan & Zhukova, Vita, 2016. "Cognitive (ir)reflection: New experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 81-93.
    3. Nicola Frignani & Giovanni Ponti, 2011. "Social vs. risk preferences under the veil of ignorance," Working Papers. Serie AD 2011-07, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    4. Antonio Cabrales & Irma Clots-Figueras & Roberto Hernán-Gonzalez & Praveen Kujal, 2020. "Instiutions, Opportunism and Prosocial Behavior: Some Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 20-17, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    5. Giovanni Ponti & Marcello Sartarelli & Iryna Sikora & Zhukova Vita, 2018. "Gaining Experience as Principal or Agent. An Experimental Study," Working Papers. Serie AD 2018-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    6. Judit Alonso & Roberto Di Paolo & Giovanni Ponti & Marcello Sartarelli, 2017. "Some (Mis)facts about 2D:4D, Preferences and Personality," Working Papers. Serie AD 2017-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    7. Frignani, Nicola & Ponti, Giovanni, 2012. "Risk versus social preferences under the veil of ignorance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 143-146.
    8. Schummer, James, 2004. "Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 154-170, July.
    9. Edgardo Bucciarelli & Andrea Oliva, 2020. "Arrow’s impossibility theorem as a special case of Nash equilibrium: a cognitive approach to the theory of collective decision-making," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 19(1), pages 15-41, June.
    10. Cesarino Bertini & Josep Freixas & Gianfranco Gambarelli & Izabella Stach, 2013. "Some Open Problems In Simple Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(02), pages 1-18.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:60:y:2008:i:3:p:546-565. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/oep .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.