IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/oxecpp/v56y2004i4p643-666.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Education choice, neoclassical growth, and class structure

Author

Listed:
  • Buly A. Cardak

Abstract

The evolution of income distribution is studied in a dynamic model of education choice where both public and private education are available. Public education is financed using a tax rate determined by majority voting. The analysis focuses on neoclassical growth in order to ensure tractability in identifying a steady state. Possible voting equilibria in the steady state are characterized, with steady state income distribution found to be bimodal. Public education offers higher growth to the poor in the transition to the steady state, however public education students converge to the lower mode of the income distribution. Under some conditions, universal public education offers steady state human capital superior to that available to any student in the mixed education model considered, while universal private education unconditionally offers steady state human capital superior to that of the mixed education model. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Buly A. Cardak, 2004. "Education choice, neoclassical growth, and class structure," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 643-666, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:56:y:2004:i:4:p:643-666
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpf067
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aughinbaugh, Alison, 2000. "Reapplication and extension: intergenerational mobility in the United States," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(6), pages 785-796, November.
    2. Kaganovich, Michael & Zilcha, Itzhak, 1999. "Education, social security, and growth," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 289-309, February.
    3. Eckstein, Zvi & Zilcha, Itzhak, 1994. "The effects of compulsory schooling on growth, income distribution and welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 339-359, July.
    4. Gerhard Glomm & B. Ravikumar, 1998. "Opting out of publicly provided services: A majority voting result," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(2), pages 187-199.
    5. Oded Galor & Joseph Zeira, 1993. "Income Distribution and Macroeconomics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(1), pages 35-52.
    6. Gradstein, Mark & Justman, Moshe, 1997. "Democratic Choice of an Education System: Implications for Growth and Income Distribution," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 169-183, July.
    7. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E., 1996. "Ends against the middle: Determining public service provision when there are private alternatives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 297-325, November.
    8. repec:bla:econom:v:71:y:2004:i::p:57-81 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Robert Tamura, 2001. "Teachers, Growth, and Convergence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 1021-1059, October.
    10. Cohen-Zada, Danny & Justman, Moshe, 2003. "The political economy of school choice: linking theory and evidence," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 277-308, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Yuki Uchida & Tetsuo Ono, 2020. "Inequality and education choice," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(4), pages 980-1018, August.
    2. John Creedy, 2006. "Education Vouchers: Means Testing Versus Uniformity," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 978, The University of Melbourne.
    3. Growiec, Katarzyna & Growiec, Jakub, 2014. "Social Capital, Trust, And Multiple Equilibria In Economic Performance," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 282-315, March.
    4. repec:bla:econom:v:71:y:2004:i::p:57-81 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Nikos Benos, 2005. "Education Systems, Growth and Welfare," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 5-2005, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    6. Nikos Benos, 2010. "Education policy, growth and welfare," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(1), pages 33-47.
    7. Salwa Trabelsi, 2017. "Mixed, Private And Public Educational Financing Regimes, Economic Growth And Income Inequality," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, vol. 62(212), pages 43-62, January -.
    8. Growiec, Katarzyna & Growiec, Jakub, 2014. "Social Capital, Trust, And Multiple Equilibria In Economic Performance," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 282-315, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Cardak, Buly A., 2005. "Education Vouchers, Growth, And Income Inequality," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 98-121, February.
    2. repec:bla:econom:v:71:y:2004:i::p:57-81 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Amedeo Piolatto, 2011. "Financing public education: a political economy model with altruistic agents and retirement concerns," Working Papers. Serie AD 2011-12, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    4. David De La Croix & Matthias Doepke, 2009. "To Segregate or to Integrate: Education Politics and Democracy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(2), pages 597-628.
    5. Brotherhood, Luiz & Delalibera, Bruno R., 2020. "Minding the gap between schools and universities," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    6. Daniel Montolio (University of Barcelona (UB) and Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB)) & Amedeo Piolatto (University of Barcelona (UB) and Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB)), 2011. "Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns," Working Papers in Economics 268, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    7. Su, Xuejuan, 2006. "Endogenous determination of public budget allocation across education stages," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 438-456, December.
    8. Glomm, Gerhard & Kaganovich, Michael, 2008. "Social security, public education and the growth-inequality relationship," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(6), pages 1009-1034, August.
    9. Roland Benabou, 2002. "Tax and Education Policy in a Heterogeneous-Agent Economy: What Levels of Redistribution Maximize Growth and Efficiency?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 481-517, March.
    10. Bearse, Peter & Cardak, Buly A. & Glomm, Gerhard & Ravikumar, B., 2013. "Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 26-37.
    11. Peter Bearse & Buly A. Cardak & Gerhard Glomm & B. Ravikumar, 2009. "Why do Education Vouchers Fail?," CAEPR Working Papers 2009-014, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    12. Kei Murata, 2017. "Education Policies, Human Capital Accumulation, and Economic Growth," International Journal of Economic Policy Studies, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 96-106, January.
    13. Buckley, Neil & Cuff, Katherine & Hurley, Jeremiah & Mestelman, Stuart & Thomas, Stephanie & Cameron, David, 2015. "Support for public provision of a private good with top-up and opt-out: A controlled laboratory experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 177-196.
    14. Fernández, Raquel, 2001. "Sorting, Education and Inequality," CEPR Discussion Papers 3020, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Buckley, Neil & Cuff, Katherine & Hurley, Jeremiah & Mestelman, Stuart & Thomas, Stephanie & Cameron, David, 2016. "Should I stay or should I go? Exit options within mixed systems of public and private health care finance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PB), pages 62-77.
    16. Danny Cohen-Zada & William Sander, 2006. "Private School Choice: The Effects Of Religion And Religiosity," Working Papers 0601, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    17. McDonald, Stuart & Zhang, Jie, 2012. "Income Inequality And Economic Growth With Altruistic Bequests And Human Capital Investment," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(S3), pages 331-354, November.
    18. Yeşilırmak, Muharrem, 2016. "A quantitative analysis of Turkish Private Education Reform," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 76-88.
    19. Cohen-Zada, Danny & Justman, Moshe, 2005. "The religious factor in private education," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 391-418, May.
    20. Buly A. Cardak, 2004. "Ability, Education, and Income Inequality," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 6(2), pages 239-276, May.
    21. Ryuichi Tanaka, 2004. "On the Costs and Benefits of a Mixed Educational Regime," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 470, Econometric Society.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid
    • O40 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:56:y:2004:i:4:p:643-666. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/oep .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.