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More than Money: Venture Capitalists on Boards

Author

Listed:
  • Natee Amornsiripanitch
  • Paul A Gompers
  • Yuhai Xuan

Abstract

We explore patterns of board structure and function in the venture capital industry, identifying factors that influence whether venture capitalists receive a board seat and whether they take action to help portfolio companies in which they invest. In a comprehensive sample of US-based and non-US-based companies, we find that a venture capital firm’s prior relationship with the founder, lead investor status, track record, network size, and geographical proximity to the portfolio company are positively correlated with its likelihood of taking a board seat in an investment round. When venture capital investors serve on the board, portfolio companies tend to recruit managers and board members from these investors’ network and are more likely to exit via relationship-based acquisitions. These patterns are particularly strong for successful and well-connected venture capitalists on the board.

Suggested Citation

  • Natee Amornsiripanitch & Paul A Gompers & Yuhai Xuan, 2019. "More than Money: Venture Capitalists on Boards," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 513-543.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:35:y:2019:i:3:p:513-543.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewz010
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Ewens & Nadya Malenko, 2020. "Board Dynamics over the Startup Life Cycle," NBER Working Papers 27769, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Douglas Cumming & Lars Helge Hass & Linda A. Myers & Monika Tarsalewska, 2023. "Does Venture Capital Backing Improve Disclosure Controls and Procedures? Evidence from Management’s Post-IPO Disclosures," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 187(3), pages 539-563, October.
    3. Calder-Wang, Sophie & Gompers, Paul A., 2021. "And the children shall lead: Gender diversity and performance in venture capital," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(1), pages 1-22.
    4. Gompers, Paul & Gornall, Will & Kaplan, Steven N. & Strebulaev, Ilya A., 2021. "Venture Capitalists and COVID-19," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(7), pages 2474-2499, November.
    5. Elena Yu. Makushina, 2022. "Disclosure by Venture Capital Funds Formed Under Investment Partnership Agreement," Finansovyj žhurnal — Financial Journal, Financial Research Institute, Moscow 125375, Russia, issue 2, pages 113-129, April.
    6. Amornsiripanitch, Natee & Gompers, Paul A. & Hu, George & Vasudevan, Kaushik, 2023. "Getting schooled: Universities and VC-backed immigrant entrepreneurs," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(7).
    7. Li Jing & Huying Zhang, 2023. "Venture Capital, Compensation Incentive, and Corporate Sustainable Development," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(7), pages 1-19, March.
    8. Ewens, Michael & Gorbenko, Alexander & Korteweg, Arthur, 2022. "Venture capital contracts," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 131-158.
    9. Alekseeva, Liudmila & Fontana, Silvia Dalla & Genc, Caroline & Ranjbar, Hedieh Rashidi, 2022. "From in-person to online: the new shape of the VC industry," SocArXiv 3pc4z, Center for Open Science.
    10. Goldstein, Anna P. & Kearney, Michael, 2020. "Know when to fold ‘em: An empirical description of risk management in public research funding," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(1).
    11. Giacomini, Emanuela & Kumar, Nitish & Naranjo, Andy, 2024. "Inter-firm relationships and the special role of common banks," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    12. Ahmed I. Kato & Chiloane-Phetla E. Germinah, 2022. "Empirical examination of relationship between venture capital financing and profitability of portfolio companies in Uganda," Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 1-18, December.
    13. Douglas Cumming & Satish Kumar & Weng Marc Lim & Nitesh Pandey, 2023. "Mapping the venture capital and private equity research: a bibliometric review and future research agenda," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 173-221, June.
    14. Welter, Chris & Holcomb, Tim R. & McIlwraith, John, 2023. "The inefficiencies of venture capital funding," Journal of Business Venturing Insights, Elsevier, vol. 19(C).
    15. Niclas Dombrowski & Wolfgang Drobetz & Lars Hornuf & Paul P. Momtaz, 2023. "The Financial and Non-Financial Performance of Token-Based Crowdfunding: Certification Arbitrage, Investor Choice, and the Optimal Timing of ICOs," CESifo Working Paper Series 10393, CESifo.
    16. Joëlle Bédat & Peter Wirtz, 2023. "The scale-up process and the nascent board’s modus operandi : The role of attention and self-efficacy [Processus de scale-up et fonctionnement du CA naissant : Le rôle de l’attention et de l’autoef," Post-Print halshs-04054887, HAL.
    17. Daniel Blaseg & Lars Hornuf, 2024. "Playing the Business Angel: The Impact of Well-Known Business Angels on Venture Performance," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 48(1), pages 171-204, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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