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Confirmation Bias in the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database

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  • Anna Harvey
  • Michael J. Woodruff

Abstract

We ask whether the widely used direction of decision and direction of vote variables in the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database (USSCJD) are contaminated by confirmation bias, or have been affected by expectations about the likely effects of judicial preferences on case outcomes. Using a sample of generally comparable cases, we find evidence that the assignment of issue codes to these cases, codes that govern the subsequent assignment of "direction" to the Court's judgments, is conditional on both case disposition and the known preferences of the deciding court, in the direction predicted by the hypothesis of confirmation bias. We also find that the USSCJD direction variables overstate the effect of judicial preferences and understate the effect of congressional preferences on case outcomes, relative to objectively coded measures of the Court's judgments. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Anna Harvey & Michael J. Woodruff, 2013. "Confirmation Bias in the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(2), pages 414-460, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:29:y:2013:i:2:p:414-460
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/ewr003
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    Cited by:

    1. Joshua B. Fischman, 2015. "Do the Justices Vote Like Policy Makers? Evidence from Scaling the Supreme Court with Interest Groups," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(S1), pages 269-293.
    2. Mario García Molina & Liliana Chicaíza Becerra, 2013. "Las decisiones de los economistas: Coase y los sesgos cognitivos en el trabajo teórico," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 15(29), pages 21-39, July-Dece.
    3. Stefanie A. Lindquist & Pamela C. Corley, 2011. "The Multiple-Stage Process of Judicial Review: Facial and As-Applied Constitutional Challenges to Legislation before the U.S. Supreme Court," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 467-502.
    4. Rajesh Bagchi & Sung H. Ham & Chuan He, 2020. "Strategic Implications of Confirmation Bias‐Inducing Advertising," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(6), pages 1573-1596, June.
    5. Mindock, Maxwell R. & Waddell, Glen R., 2019. "Vote Influence in Group Decision-Making: The Changing Role of Justices' Peers on the Supreme Court," IZA Discussion Papers 12317, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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