IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/jconrs/v33y2006i3p329-341.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Articulation Compatibility in Eliciting Price Bids

Author

Listed:
  • Alexander Chernev

Abstract

Do consumers prefer auctions that allow them to place more precise bids to auctions that accept less precise bids? Can consumers accurately estimate their need for price-elicitation precision? This research addresses these questions by applying the notion of compatibility to the relationship between consumers' bidding price uncertainty and the precision implied by the price-elicitation task. Data from four experiments show that when consumers are uncertain about the optimal bidding price, decision tasks requiring elicitation of precise bids lead to lower decision confidence, and vice versa. It is further shown that consumers display stronger preference for high-precision auctions, even though such auctions are associated with less confident pricing decisions. (c) 2006 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, Inc..

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Chernev, 2006. "Articulation Compatibility in Eliciting Price Bids," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 33(3), pages 329-341, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jconrs:v:33:y:2006:i:3:p:329-341
    DOI: 10.1086/508526
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/508526
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1086/508526?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Scott Fay & Robert Zeithammer, 2017. "Bidding for Bidders? How the Format for Soliciting Supplier Participation in NYOP Auctions Impacts Channel Profit," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(12), pages 4324-4344, December.
    2. Scott Fay & Juliano Laran, 2009. "Implications of Expected Changes in the Seller's Price in Name-Your-Own-Price Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(11), pages 1783-1796, November.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jconrs:v:33:y:2006:i:3:p:329-341. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/jcr .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.