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Court-Appointed Neutral Economic Experts

Author

Listed:
  • J. Gregory Sidak

Abstract

Complex civil litigation routinely includes expert economic testimony. However, it may be hard for a jury to determine at trial which expert economist is more credible, and it may be hard for the judge to determine at the Daubert hearing whether the methodology upon which a given expert economist relies is intellectually rigorous enough to produce results that constitute admissible testimony. One solution rarely employed is for the court to appoint its own neutral economic expert under Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence when a lawsuit contains a claim for damages that will require rigorous analysis of data. Based on my recent experience as Judge Richard Posner’s court-appointed economic expert on damages in patent infringement litigation, I explain how the wider use of Rule 706 would assist the judge and jury and would facilitate the prompt settlement of intellectual property, antitrust, securities, contract, business tort, and other complex disputes. The benefits to courts and litigants would surely exceed the costs.

Suggested Citation

  • J. Gregory Sidak, 2013. "Court-Appointed Neutral Economic Experts," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 359-394.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:9:y:2013:i:2:p:359-394.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nht011
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kim, Chulyoung, 2016. "Adversarial bias, litigation, and the Daubert test: An economic approach," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 67-75.
    2. Chulyoung Kim, 2017. "An economic rationale for dismissing low-quality experts in trial," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 64(5), pages 445-466, November.
    3. Chulyoung Kim & Paul S. Koh, 2020. "Court‐appointed experts and accuracy in adversarial litigation," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 16(3), pages 282-305, September.
    4. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2018. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 67-107, August.
    5. Svetlana Avdasheva & Svetlana Golovanova & Elena Sidorova, 2022. "Does judicial effort matter for quality? Evidence from antitrust proceedings in Russian commercial courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 425-450, June.
    6. Kim, Chulyoung, 2015. "Centralized vs. Decentralized Institutions for Expert Testimony," MPRA Paper 69618, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Christiansen Arndt, 2013. "Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb: Besprechung der gleichnamigen Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 64(1), pages 500-508, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • A11 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Role of Economics; Role of Economists
    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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