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Legal Transplant, Legal Origin, And Antitrust Effectiveness

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  • Tay-Cheng Ma

Abstract

This article shows that, in the process of antitrust transplant, the impact of legal tradition on antitrust effectiveness depends on whether or not the country is receptive to the transplanted antitrust regime. A successful antitrust transplant requires institutional structures in host countries that are able to support and maintain transplanted laws. If the transplant country fails to meet this institutional requirement, then the enforcement of competition law will have a very limited effect in regard to improving market competition, and its transplantation will be neither harmful nor helpful in terms of law enforcement. At this point, regardless of the legal tradition in which the antitrust judiciary appears, there is little correlation between legal origin and antitrust effectiveness.

Suggested Citation

  • Tay-Cheng Ma, 2013. "Legal Transplant, Legal Origin, And Antitrust Effectiveness," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 65-88.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:9:y:2013:i:1:p:65-88.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nhs032
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    Cited by:

    1. Giampaolo Lecce & Laura Ogliari & Tommaso Orlando, 2017. "Resistance to Institutions and Cultural Distance: Brigandage in Post-Unification Italy," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2097R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Dec 2017.
    2. Grajzl, Peter & Baniak, Andrzej, 2018. "Private enforcement, corruption, and antitrust design," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 284-307.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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