THE DETERMINATION OF ANTITRUST LIABILITY IN UNITED STATES v. MICROSOFT: THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE USED TO PROVE ITS CASE
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References listed on IDEAS
- David S. Evans & Albert L. Nichols & Richard Schmalensee, 2005. "UNITED STATES v. MICROSOFT: DID CONSUMERS WIN?," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(3), pages 497-539.
- repec:aei:rpbook:53444 is not listed on IDEAS
- Michael D. Whinston, 2001. "Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 63-80, Spring.
- repec:reg:rpubli:61 is not listed on IDEAS
- Micha Gisser & Mark Allen, 2001. "One Monopoly Is Better Than Two: Antitrust Policy and Microsoft," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 19(2), pages 211-225, September.
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