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International Merger Control: How Long Does it Take and How Much Does it Cost? An Empirical Study Based on the Brazilian Case Law

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Listed:
  • Paulo Burnier da Silveira
  • Isabela Maiolino

Abstract

This paper analyses both the duration and the expenses resulting from notification fees in relation to international merger control proceedings in Brazil. For this purpose, the research relies on a dataset of 192 cases reviewed by the Brazilian Competition Authority between 2013 and 2022. The dataset indicates that an international merger requires in average 103 days for time review in Brazil, eight notifications to competition authorities around the globe and €175,794.00 in expenses with notification fees. In addition, the 192 cases revealed a total of 1,562 merger notifications worldwide involving 73 jurisdictions. The research provides a descriptive overview of the statistics and a correlation analysis between the duration of the international merger reviews and key factors (i.e. geographic scope of transaction, number of jurisdictions notified, existence of international cooperation, number of relevant markets, type of decisions, number of staff, and expenses with notification fees). The paper concludes with a summary of the key findings and suggestions for future work.

Suggested Citation

  • Paulo Burnier da Silveira & Isabela Maiolino, 2025. "International Merger Control: How Long Does it Take and How Much Does it Cost? An Empirical Study Based on the Brazilian Case Law," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 120-135.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:21:y:2025:i:1:p:120-135.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nhae020
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C01 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Econometrics
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L49 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Other
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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