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Tacit Collusion Indicators In Merger Control Under Varied Focal Points

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  • Adrian J. Proctor

Abstract

This article discusses how different focal points in a market can lead to different collusive agreements and how merger analysis can identify markets that may be vulnerable to these potential agreements. Focal points based on customer allocation and geographic markets are considered with recent U.K. examples of this type of analysis. The focal point that firms are using for coordination can affect both the transparency required to maintain coordination and how targeted or effective any punishment for deviation can be.

Suggested Citation

  • Adrian J. Proctor, 2014. "Tacit Collusion Indicators In Merger Control Under Varied Focal Points," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(4), pages 959-987.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:10:y:2014:i:4:p:959-987.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nhu019
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    Cited by:

    1. Proctor, Adrian, 2013. "Economic indicators for the presence of tacit collusion in merger control under varied focal points," MPRA Paper 64964, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2014.
    2. Andreas Freitag & Catherine Roux & Christian Thöni, 2021. "Communication And Market Sharing: An Experiment On The Exchange Of Soft And Hard Information," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(1), pages 175-198, February.
    3. Proctor, Adrian, 2015. "Conglomerate Mergers: Comparison with Vertical Foreclosure," MPRA Paper 68137, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L - Industrial Organization
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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