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Morals as an incentive? A field study on honour based flower picking

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  • Achim Schlüter
  • Bjoern Vollan

Abstract

This paper analyses people's decision to snatch flowers which are marketed via the honour system. If people were to make a narrow rational choice that they would snatch the unattended flowers, the market would collapse. We find that actual payment rates vary substantially between individuals. The decision to snatch relies on internalised values and norms ('internal deltas'). The econometric analysis of the impact of socio-demographic variables on payment rates provides a first indication that differences in socialisation processes lead to different internal deltas. Oxford University Press and Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics 2010; all rights reserved. For permissions, please email journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press.

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  • Achim Schlüter & Bjoern Vollan, 2011. "Morals as an incentive? A field study on honour based flower picking," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 38(1), pages 79-97, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:erevae:v:38:y:2011:i:1:p:79-97
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/erae/jbq045
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    Cited by:

    1. Schlüter, Achim & Vollan, Björn, 2015. "Flowers and an honour box: Evidence on framing effects," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 186-199.
    2. Salima Douhou & Jan Magnus & Arthur Soest, 2012. "Peer Reporting and the Perception of Fairness," De Economist, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 289-310, September.
    3. Fenzl, Thomas & Brudermann, Thomas, 2021. "Eye cues increase cooperation in the dictator game under physical attendance of a recipient, but not for all," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    4. Lenger, Alexander & Kruse, Jan, 2012. "Rekonstruktive Forschungsmethoden in der deutschen Volkswirtschaftslehre: Eine explorative Erhebung zugrunde liegender Repräsentationsmuster," The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers 02-2012, University of Freiburg, Department of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory.
    5. Thomas Brudermann & Gregory Bartel & Thomas Fenzl & Sebastian Seebauer, 2015. "Eyes on social norms: A field study on an honor system for newspaper sale," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(2), pages 285-306, September.

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