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Fighting collusion by regulating communication between firms

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  • Kai-Uwe Kühn

Abstract

Summary Fighting collusion Regulation of communication between firmsThis paper is an attempt to create a coherent approach to the design of competition policy enforcement against collusion based on theoretical considerations, evidence from economic experiments, and case studies. I argue that collusion should primarily be fought indirectly by targeting types of communication between firms that are particularly likely to facilitate collusion. In particular, I identify types of communication which have high potential anti-competitive effects but where it is unlikely that prohibiting communication will lead to efficiency losses. This analysis leads to some simple rules concerning communication between firms, which could also guide the development of competition rules for B2B electronic market places.— Kai-Uwe Kühn

Suggested Citation

  • Kai-Uwe Kühn, 2001. "Fighting collusion by regulating communication between firms," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 16(32), pages 168-204.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecpoli:v:16:y:2001:i:32:p:168-204.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1468-0327.00073
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sahuguet, Nicolas & Walckiers, Alexis, 2013. "Selling to a cartel of retailers: a model of hub-and-spoke collusion," CEPR Discussion Papers 9385, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Hogendorn Christian, 2007. "Tacit Collusion in Capacity Investment: The Role of Capacity Exchanges," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-16, July.
    3. Mouraviev, Igor, 2014. "Explicit Collusion under Antitrust Enforcement," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 494, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    4. Flavia Roldán, 2012. "Collusive Networks in Market‐Sharing Agreements in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 965-987, December.
    5. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2014. "Communication in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 152-176.
    6. Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, 2005. "Role and Effects of Credit Information Sharing," CSEF Working Papers 136, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    7. List, John A. & Neilson, William S. & Price, Michael K., 2016. "The effects of group composition in a strategic environment: Evidence from a field experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 67-85.
    8. Mouraviev, Igor, 2006. "Private Observation, Tacit Collusion and Collusion with Communication," Working Paper Series 672, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    9. Sahuguet, Nicolas & Walckiers, Alexis, 2017. "A theory of hub-and-spoke collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 353-370.
    10. Kets, Willemien & Kager, Wouter & Sandroni, Alvaro, 2022. "The value of a coordination game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    11. Ralf Dewenter & Ulrich Heimeshoff & Hendrik Lüth, 2017. "The impact of the market transparency unit for fuels on gasoline prices in Germany," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(5), pages 302-305, March.
    12. Donatella Porrini, 2015. "Risk Classification Efficiency and the Insurance Market Regulation," Risks, MDPI, vol. 3(4), pages 1-10, September.
    13. Rastislav Funta, 2012. "Legal and Economic Analysis of Cartels, their Enforcement and the Leniency Program," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 2, pages 35-47, June.
    14. Gerlach, Heiko, 2009. "Stochastic market sharing, partial communication and collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 655-666, November.

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