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Distributive Justice for Behavioural Welfare Economics

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  • Michael Mandler

Abstract

The incompleteness of behavioural preferences can lead many or even all allocations to qualify as Pareto optimal. But the incompleteness does not undercut the precision of utilitarian policy recommendations. Utilitarian methods can be applied to groups of goods or to the multiple social welfare functions that arise when individual preferences are incomplete, and policymakers do not need to provide the preference comparisons that individuals are unable to make for themselves. The utilitarian orderings that result, although also incomplete, can generate a unique optimum. Non-separabilities in consumption reduce this precision but in all cases the dimension of the utilitarian optima drops substantially relative to the Pareto optima.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Mandler, 2020. "Distributive Justice for Behavioural Welfare Economics," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(628), pages 1114-1134.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:econjl:v:130:y:2020:i:628:p:1114-1134.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ej/ueaa008
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    Cited by:

    1. Bade, Sophie & Segal-Halevi, Erel, 2023. "Fairness for multi-self agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 321-336.
    2. Galanis, Giorgos & Veneziani, Roberto, 2022. "Behavioural utilitarianism and distributive justice," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).

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