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Dynamic Common Agency and Investment: The Economics of Movie Distribution

Author

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  • Darren Filson

Abstract

This article analyzes investment and other strategies in a stationary dynamic common agency model of movie distribution. Contract choices interact with other strategic choices. The model explains several facts; movie distributors avoid head-to-head new hit releases, hits have longer runs than flops, and distributors receive the lion's share of value generated by hits. The model yields testable implications about the effects of vertical integration on inventory turnover, release decisions, run lengths, and allocations, but the results depend on how integration affects relative bargaining power. Vertical integration is privately profitable and may improve social welfare even though it reduces industry profits. (JEL L14, L22, L82, C61) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Darren Filson, 2005. "Dynamic Common Agency and Investment: The Economics of Movie Distribution," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 43(4), pages 773-784, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:43:y:2005:i:4:p:773-784
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ei/cbi054
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Don M. Chance & Eric Hillebrand & Jimmy E. Hilliard, 2008. "Pricing an Option on Revenue from an Innovation: An Application to Movie Box Office Revenue," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(5), pages 1015-1028, May.
    2. F. Andrew Hanssen, 2010. "Vertical Integration during the Hollywood Studio Era," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(3), pages 519-543.
    3. Darlene Chisholm & Margaret McMillan & George Norman, 2010. "Product differentiation and film-programming choice: do first-run movie theatres show the same films?," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 34(2), pages 131-145, May.
    4. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
    5. Ricard Gil & Wesley Hartmann, 2007. "The Role and Determinants of Concession Sales in Movie Theaters: Evidence from the Spanish Exhibition Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 30(4), pages 325-347, June.
    6. Amanda S. King & John T. King & Michael Reksulak, 2017. "Signaling for access to high-demand markets: evidence from the US motion picture industry," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 41(4), pages 441-465, November.
    7. Juan Prieto-Rodriguez & Fernanda Gutierrez-Navratil & Victoria Ateca-Amestoy, 2015. "Theatre allocation as a distributor’s strategic variable over movie runs," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 39(1), pages 65-83, February.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis

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