Are Autocratic Rulers Also Inside Traders? Cross-Country Evidence
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Cited by:
- Wong, Wing-Keung & Du, Jun & Chong, Terence Tai-Leung, 2005.
"Do the technical indicators reward chartists? A study on the stock markets of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan,"
Review of Applied Economics, Lincoln University, Department of Financial and Business Systems, vol. 1(2), pages 1-23.
- Wing-Keung Wong & Jun Du & Terence Tai-Leung Chong, 2005. "Do the technical indicators reward chartists? A study on the stock markets of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan," Finance Working Papers 22587, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
- David M. Kemme & Bhavik Parikh & Tanja Steigner, 2021. "Inequality, autocracy, and sovereign funds as determinants of foreign portfolio equity flows," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 44(2), pages 249-278, June.
- Wong, Wing-Keung & Du, Jun & Chong, Terence Tai-Leung, 2005.
"Do the technical indicators reward chartists? A study on the stock markets of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan,"
Review of Applied Economics, Lincoln University, Department of Financial and Business Systems, vol. 1(2), pages 1-23.
- Wing-Keung Wong & Jun Du & Terence Tai-Leung Chong, 2005. "Do the technical indicators reward chartists? A study on the stock markets of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan," Finance Working Papers 22587, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
- Wing-Keung Wong & Jun Du & Terence Tai-Leung Chong, 2005. "Do the technical indicators reward chartists? A study on the stock markets of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan," SCAPE Policy Research Working Paper Series 0512, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics, SCAPE.
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JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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