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And a Hockey Game Broke Out: Crime and Punishment in the NHL

Author

Listed:
  • Jac C. Heckelman
  • Andrew J. Yates

Abstract

We apply the economic theory of crime to the National Hockey League. We analyze a natural experiment in which games during the 1999--2000 season had either one or two referees. We determine the effect of the number of referees on both the number of penalties called and the number of rules infractions committed by players. The results indicate that increasing the number of referees leads to greater enforcement of the rules but does not significantly deter players from committing infractions. (JEL D0, K4) Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Jac C. Heckelman & Andrew J. Yates, 2003. "And a Hockey Game Broke Out: Crime and Punishment in the NHL," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(4), pages 705-712, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:41:y:2003:i:4:p:705-712
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ei/cbg038
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Witt, 2005. "Do Players React To Sanction Changes? Evidence From The English Premier League," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 52(4), pages 623-640, September.
    2. Peter Dawson & Patrick Massey & Paul Downward, 2020. "Television match officials, referees, and home advantage: Evidence from the European Rugby Cup," Sport Management Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(3), pages 443-454, July.
    3. Abrevaya Jason & McCulloch Robert, 2014. "Reversal of fortune: a statistical analysis of penalty calls in the National Hockey League," Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 207-224, June.
    4. Joseph P. McGarrity & Brian Linnen, 2010. "Pass or Run: An Empirical Test of the Matching Pennies Game Using Data from the National Football League," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 76(3), pages 791-810, January.
    5. Haisken-DeNew, John P. & Vorell, Matthias, 2008. "Blood Money: Incentives for Violence in NHL Hockey," Ruhr Economic Papers 47, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    6. repec:zbw:rwirep:0047 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Taylor P. Stevenson & Robert D. Tollison & Dennis Pearson, 2012. "Efficacy of shaming penalties: Evidence from SEC football," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(2), pages 1162-1170.
    8. John Charles Bradbury & Douglas J. Drinen, 2007. "Crime And Punishment In Major League Baseball: The Case Of The Designated Hitter And Hit Batters," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(1), pages 131-144, January.
    9. John P. Haisken-DeNew & Matthias Vorell, 2008. "Blood Money: Incentives for Violence in NHL Hockey," Ruhr Economic Papers 0047, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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