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Can Adequate Child Support Be Legislated? Responses to Guidelines and Enforcement

Author

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  • Laura M. Argys
  • H. Elizabeth Peters

Abstract

This article explores the relationship between noncustodial parents' willingness to pay child support, state child support guidelines and enforcement efforts, and child support awards and subsequent compliance. Our game theoretic model, which distinguishes cases of asymmetric information from cases of symmetric information, demonstrates that guidelines and increased enforcement can increase payments when awards are court-ordered but may not increase payments and could even reduce child expenditures when some payment would otherwise have occurred voluntarily. Our analyses of awards to divorced or separated mothers from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth are consistent with the model. (JEL J12) Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Laura M. Argys & H. Elizabeth Peters, 2003. "Can Adequate Child Support Be Legislated? Responses to Guidelines and Enforcement," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(3), pages 463-479, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:41:y:2003:i:3:p:463-479
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ei/cbg021
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sarah Reynolds, 2022. "Household transitions between ages 5 and 15 and educational outcomes: Fathers and grandparents in Peru," Demographic Research, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany, vol. 46(14), pages 397-440.
    2. Schaubert, Marianna, 2022. "Do courts know how to incentivize? Behavioral response of non-resident parents to child support obligations," Children and Youth Services Review, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    3. Maureen R. Waller, 2010. "Viewing Low-Income Fathers’ Ties to Families through a Cultural Lens: Insights for Research and Policy," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 629(1), pages 102-124, May.
    4. Urvi Neelakantan, 2009. "The impact of changes in child support policy," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 22(3), pages 641-663, July.
    5. Christine Hauser, 2008. "Child Support Enforcement and Children's Consumption," 2008 Meeting Papers 630, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Sandra Hofferth & Nicole Forry & H. Peters, 2010. "Child Support, Father–Child Contact, and Preteens’ Involvement with Nonresidential Fathers: Racial/Ethnic Differences," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 14-32, March.
    7. repec:pri:crcwel:wp06-09-ff is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Reagan A. Baughman, 2017. "The impact of child support on child health," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 69-91, March.
    9. Cécile Bourreau-Dubois & Myriam Doriat-Duban & Jean-Claude Ray, 2014. "Child support order: how do judges decide without guidelines? Evidence from France," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 431-452, December.
    10. Lenna Nepomnyaschy, 2007. "Child support and father-child contact: Testing reciprocal pathways," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 44(1), pages 93-112, February.
    11. Lenna Nepomnyaschy & Irwin Garfinkel, 2009. "Child Support Enforcement and Fathers' Contributions to Their Nonmarital Children," Working Papers 909, Princeton University, School of Public and International Affairs, Center for Research on Child Wellbeing..

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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