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Until Death Do You Part: The Effects of Unilateral Divorce on Spousal Homicides

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  • Thomas S. Dee

    (Department of Economics, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA 19081 and Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research.)

Abstract

This study examines how the widespread adoption of unilateral divorce influenced the prevalence of lethal spousal violence in the United States. These evaluations are based on fixed-effects specifications for spousal homicide counts from an annual panel of U.S. states from 1968 to 1978. The results indicate that unrestricted unilateral divorce laws had small and statistically insignificant effects on the amount of lethal spousal violence directed against wives. However, the easy access to divorce created by such laws increased spousal homicides of husbands by approximately 21%. These increases were concentrated in states where the division of marital property favored husbands. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas S. Dee, 2003. "Until Death Do You Part: The Effects of Unilateral Divorce on Spousal Homicides," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(1), pages 163-182, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:41:y:2003:i:1:p:163-182
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Fernández-Kranz, Daniel & Roff, Jennifer Louise & Sun, Hugette, 2018. "Can Reduced Child Support Make Joint Custody Bad for Children? The Role of Economic Incentives in U.S. Divorce Law on Child Outcomes," IZA Discussion Papers 12025, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Elena Pisanelli, 2024. "Divorce, domestic violence, and help seeking," Working Papers wp1195, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    3. Lagomarsino, Bruno Cardinale & Rossi, Martin A., 2024. "JUE insight: The unintended effect of Argentina's subsidized homeownership lottery program on intimate partner violence," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    4. Martin Halla, 2009. "The Effect of Joint Custody on Marriage and Divorce," NRN working papers 2009-09, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    5. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, 2006. "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Divorce Laws and Family Distress," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 121(1), pages 267-288.
    6. Martin Halla, 2013. "The Effect Of Joint Custody On Family Outcomes," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 278-315, April.
    7. Janet Currie & Michael Mueller-Smith & Maya Rossin-Slater, 2022. "Violence While in Utero: The Impact of Assaults during Pregnancy on Birth Outcomes," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 104(3), pages 525-540, May.
    8. Jennifer Roff, 2017. "Cleaning in the Shadow of the Law? Bargaining, Marital Investment, and the Impact of Divorce Law on Husbands' Intrahousehold Work," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 60(1), pages 115-134.
    9. Smith, Ian, 2007. "Property division on divorce with inequity aversion," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 111-128.
    10. Oleksandr Zhylyevskyy, 2012. "Spousal Conflict and Divorce," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(4), pages 915-962.
    11. Pablo Brassiolo, 2016. "Domestic Violence and Divorce Law: When Divorce Threats Become Credible," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 443-477.
    12. Anna Aizer, 2010. "The Gender Wage Gap and Domestic Violence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1847-1859, September.
    13. Corradini, Viola & Buccione, Giulia, 2023. "Unilateral divorce rights, domestic violence and women’s agency: Evidence from the Egyptian Khul reform," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    14. Julio Cáceres-Delpiano & Eugenio Giolito, 2012. "The Impact of Unilateral Divorce on Crime," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 215-248.
    15. Anna Aizer, 2007. "Wages, Violence and Health in the Household," NBER Working Papers 13494, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Geghetsik Afunts & Stepan Jurajda, 2022. "Who Divorces Whom: Unilateral Divorce Legislation and the Educational Structure of Marriage," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp740, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    17. Bellido, Héctor & Marcén, Miriam, 2011. "Divorce laws and fertility decisions," MPRA Paper 30243, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Chigavazira, Abraham & Fisher, Hayley & Robinson, Tim & Zhu, Anna, 2019. "The Consequences of Extending Equitable Property Division Divorce Laws to Cohabitants," IZA Discussion Papers 12102, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    19. Aizer, Anna & Dal B, Pedro, 2009. "Love, hate and murder: Commitment devices in violent relationships," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(3-4), pages 412-428, April.
    20. Fernández-Kranz, Daniel & Nollenberger, Natalia & Roff, Jennifer Louise, 2020. "Bargaining under Threats: The Effect of Joint Custody Laws on Intimate Partner Violence," IZA Discussion Papers 13810, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    21. Shen, Danqing, 2018. "Marriage, Divorce and Sorting: A Reassessment of Unilateral Divorce Laws," MPRA Paper 92848, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    22. Gustavo J Bobonis & Roberto Castro & Juan S Morales, 2020. "Legal Reforms, Conditional Cash Transfers, and Intimate Partner Violence: Evidence from Mexico," Working Papers tecipa-678, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    23. García-Ramos, Aixa, 2021. "Divorce laws and intimate partner violence: Evidence from Mexico," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    24. Ribar, David C., 2004. "What Do Social Scientists Know About the Benefits of Marriage? A Review of Quantitative Methodologies," IZA Discussion Papers 998, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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