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Voting in Firms: The Role of Agenda Control, Size and Voter Homogeneity

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  • Benham, Lee
  • Keefer, Philip

Abstract

Voting is a common feature of most firms. Unrestricted voting, however, can lead to unstable decision-making. The authors find that firms make trade-offs among collective decision-making, production scale, firm structure, and voter characteristics that are consistent with efforts to economize on the costs of voting. Firm responses include agenda control, restrictions to obtain a homogeneous voting population, and limits on firm size. The authors consider three long-surviving producer cooperatives, representing extreme cases of collective decision-making, and find that their organization is sensitive to the costs of voting and to the employment of mechanisms to constrain those costs. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Benham, Lee & Keefer, Philip, 1991. "Voting in Firms: The Role of Agenda Control, Size and Voter Homogeneity," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(4), pages 706-719, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:29:y:1991:i:4:p:706-19
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    Cited by:

    1. Evans, Lewis & Meade, Richard, 2005. "The Role and Significance of Cooperatives in New Zealand Agriculture, A Comparative Institutional Analysis," Working Paper Series 3847, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    2. Michael Kremer, 1997. "Why are Worker Cooperatives So Rare?," NBER Working Papers 6118, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Gregory Dow, 2001. "Allocating Control over Firms: Stock Markets versus Membership Markets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 18(2), pages 201-218, March.
    4. Kevin Roberts, 2013. "The Dynamics of Delegated Decision Making," Economics Series Working Papers 678, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    5. Steven C. Hackett, 1992. "Heterogeneity and the Provision of Governance for Common-Pool Resources," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(3), pages 325-342, July.
    6. Scott E. Masten, 2006. "Authority and Commitment: Why Universities, Like Legislatures, Are Not Organized as Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 649-684, September.
    7. Lewis Evans & Graeme Guthrie, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Cooperatives: The Link between Efficiency and Valuation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(2), pages 364-383, June.
    8. repec:bla:annpce:v:89:y:2018:i:1:p:65-86 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Abhijit Banerjee & Dilip Mookherjee & Kaivan Munshi & Debraj Ray, 2001. "Inequality, Control Rights, and Rent Seeking: Sugar Cooperatives in Maharashtra," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(1), pages 138-190, February.
    10. Gabriel Burdín, 2016. "Equality Under Threat by the Talented: Evidence from Worker‐Managed Firms," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(594), pages 1372-1403, August.
    11. Gregory Dow, 1996. "Replicating Walrasian equilibria using markets for membership in labor-managed firms," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 147-162, December.
    12. Dow, Gregory K. & Putterman, Louis, 2000. "Why capital suppliers (usually) hire workers: what we know and what we need to know," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 319-336, November.
    13. Andrés Dean, 2023. "Membership Heterogeneity and Workplace democracy," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 23-19, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
    14. Damion Jonathan Bunders & Agnes Akkerman, 2023. "Commitment issues? Analysing the effect of preference deviation and social embeddedness on member commitment to worker cooperatives in the gig economy," Economic and Industrial Democracy, Department of Economic History, Uppsala University, Sweden, vol. 44(4), pages 1007-1026, November.
    15. Guillermo Alves & Gabriel Burdin & Paula Carrasco & Andrés Dean & Andrés Rius, 2012. "Empleo, remuneraciones e inversión en cooperativas de trabajadores y empresas convencionales: nueva evidencia para Uruguay," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 12-14, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
    16. Gregory K. DOW, 2018. "The Theory Of The Labor-Managed Firm: Past, Present, And Future," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 89(1), pages 65-86, March.
    17. Derek C. Jones & Panu Kalmi, 2009. "Trust, Inequality And The Size Of The Co‐Operative Sector: Cross‐Country Evidence," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 80(2), pages 165-195, June.
    18. Dow,Gregory K., 2019. "The Labor-Managed Firm," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107589650, October.

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