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The Political Economy of New Deal Fiscal Federalism

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  • Wallis, John Joseph

Abstract

While the introduction of federal matching grants to finance the New Deal relief programs is usually viewed as a mechanism to insure federal control over state relief spending, a careful study of the New Deal reveals that the reverse was the case: matching grants allowed the states to escape close federal control. The standard economic model of intergovernmental grants reveals that the federal government will, if allowed, prefer to use discretionary rather than matching grants. With discretion, however, came power; power that neither the states nor Congress wished to see concentrated in the executive branch. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Wallis, John Joseph, 1991. "The Political Economy of New Deal Fiscal Federalism," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(3), pages 510-524, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:29:y:1991:i:3:p:510-24
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Worthington, Andrew C & Dollery, Brian E, 1998. "The Political Determination of Intergovernmental Grants in Australia," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 299-315, March.
    2. Wallis, John Joseph, 1998. "The Political Economy of New Deal Spending Revisited, Again: With and without Nevada," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 140-170, April.
    3. John Joseph Wallis, 1996. "What Determines the Allocation of National Government Grants to the States?," NBER Historical Working Papers 0090, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Joshua L. Rosenbloom, 1999. "The Challenges of Economic Maturity: New England, 1880 - 1940," NBER Historical Working Papers 0113, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. John Joseph Wallis & Price Fishback & Shawn Kantor, 2005. "Politics, Relief, and Reform: The Transformation of America's Social Welfare System during the New Deal," NBER Working Papers 11080, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. John Joseph Wallis, 2000. "American Government Finance in the Long Run: 1790 to 1990," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 61-82, Winter.
    7. Gregori Galofré-Vilà & Martin McKee & David Stuckler, 2022. "Quantifying the mortality impact of the 1935 old-age assistance," European Review of Economic History, European Historical Economics Society, vol. 26(1), pages 62-77.
    8. Price Fishback & Samuel Allen & Jonathan Fox & Brendan Livingston, 2010. "A Patchwork Safety Net: A Survey Of Cliometric Studies Of Income Maintenance Programs In The United States In The First Half Of The Twentieth Century," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(5), pages 895-940, December.
    9. Rhode, Paul W. & Snyder, Jr., James M. & Strumpf, Koleman, 2018. "The arsenal of democracy: Production and politics during WWII," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 145-161.
    10. FG Mixon Jr & DL Hobson, 2001. "Intergovernmental Grants And The Positioning Of Presidential Primaries And Caucuses: Empirical Evidence From The 1992, 1996, And 2000 Election Cycles," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(1), pages 27-38, January.
    11. Silika Prohl & Friedrich Schneider, 2009. "Does Decentralization Reduce Government Size? A Quantitative Study of the Decentralization Hypothesis," Public Finance Review, , vol. 37(6), pages 639-664, November.
    12. Paolo Liberati & Agnese Sacchi, 2013. "Tax decentralization and local government size," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 183-205, October.
    13. Wallis, John, 2001. "The Political Economy of New Deal Spending, Yet Again: A Reply to Fleck," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 305-314, April.
    14. Lars Feld & Christoph Schaltegger, 2010. "Political stability and fiscal policy: time series evidence for the Swiss federal level since 1849," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(3), pages 505-534, September.
    15. Mason, Joseph R., 2003. "The political economy of Reconstruction Finance Corporation assistance during the Great Depression," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 101-121, April.
    16. Robert K. Fleck, 1999. "Electoral Incentives, Public Policy, and the New Deal Realignment," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(3), pages 377-404, January.

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