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Bashing and Coercion in Monetary Policy

Author

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  • Waller, Christopher J

Abstract

Political pressure, or "bashing," by the administration is typically believed to be one way that the administration can coerce an otherwise independent central bank into following the administration's preferred monetary policy path. This paper develops a model for analyzing this type of policy "cooperation" and demonstrates that bashing the central bank creates uncertainty on the part of private agents with regard to future policy actions, which translates into real wage and output variability. Hence, although beneficial to the administration, political pressure creates uncertainty and thus economic instability. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Waller, Christopher J, 1991. "Bashing and Coercion in Monetary Policy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(1), pages 1-13, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:29:y:1991:i:1:p:1-13
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Philipp Maier & Saskia Bezoen, 2002. "Central bank bashing: The case of the European Central Bank," Macroeconomics 0209001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Etienne Farvaque & Muhammad Azmat Hayat & Alexander Mihailov, 2017. "Who Supports the ECB? Evidence from Eurobarometer Survey Data," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 654-677, April.
    3. Etienne Farvaque & Norimichi Matsueda, 2017. "Optimal Term Length For An Overconfident Central Banker," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 62(01), pages 179-192, March.
    4. Belke, Ansgar & Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1126-1139.
    5. repec:zbw:rwirep:0094 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Donato Masciandaro, 1995. "Designing a central bank: Social player, monetary agent, or banking agent?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 399-410, October.
    7. Popova, Olga & See, Sarah Grace & Nikolova, Milena & Otrachshenko, Vladimir, 2023. "The Societal Costs of Inflation and Unemployment," IZA Discussion Papers 16541, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Maier, Philipp & Bezoen, Saskia, 2004. "Bashing and supporting central banks: the Bundesbank and the European Central Bank," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 923-939, November.
    9. Beckmann, Joscha & Ademmer, Esther & Belke, Ansgar & Schweickert, Rainer, 2017. "The political economy of the impossible trinity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 103-123.
    10. M.A. Jenkins, 1996. "Central bank independence and inflation performance: panacea or placebo?," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 49(197), pages 241-270.
    11. Hayat, Muhammad Azmat & Farvaque, Etienne, 2012. "Public attitudes towards central bank independence: Lessons from the foundation of the ECB," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 512-523.
    12. Garcia De Paso, Jose I., 2000. "Partisan Appointments to the Central Bank: Policy Uncertainty and the Democratic Deficit," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 471-489, July.
    13. Farvaque, Etienne & Lagadec, Gaël, 2001. "Divided boards: Partisanship through delegated monetary policy," ZEI Working Papers B 01-2001, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
    14. Ansgar Belke & Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? – A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Ruhr Economic Papers 0094, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    15. repec:cii:cepiei:2010-4ta is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Mixon, Franklin Jr. & Upadhyaya, Kamal P., 2004. "Examining legislative challenges to central bank autonomy: macroeconomic and agency costs models," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 415-428.

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