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Central Bank Reputation and the Monetization of Deficits: The 1981 Italian Monetary Reform

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  • Tabellini, Guido

Abstract

In 1981 the Bank of Italy was freed from the obligation to purchase the unsold public debt at the Treasury auctions. Si nce then, the Bank of Italy has reduced debt monetization. This paper seeks to explain this policy shift by analyzing a game between the m onetary and fiscal authorities. The fiscal authority is imperfectly i nformed about the central bank preferences. An equilibrium exists in which the central bank does not monetize, so as to establish a reputa tion of being independent. Monetization raises fiscal deficits and ma y raise public debt relative to a nonaccommodative policy. Copyright 1987 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Central Bank Reputation and the Monetization of Deficits: The 1981 Italian Monetary Reform," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(2), pages 185-200, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:25:y:1987:i:2:p:185-200
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    Cited by:

    1. Silvana Bartoletto & Bruno Chiarini & Elisabetta Marzano, 2013. "Is the Italian Public Debt Really Unsustainable? An Historical Comparison (1861-2010)," CESifo Working Paper Series 4185, CESifo.
    2. Ioannis Dokas & Georgios Oikonomou & Stephanos Papadamou & Eleftherios Spyromitros, 2023. "Central Bank Credibility’s Effect on Stock Exchange Returns’ Volatility: Evidence from OECD Countries," Economies, MDPI, vol. 11(10), pages 1-15, October.
    3. Padovano, Fabio & Venturi, Larissa, 2001. "Wars of Attrition in Italian Government Coalitions and Fiscal Performance: 1948-1994," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 109(1-2), pages 15-54, October.
    4. Caravaggio, Nicola & Carnazza, Giovanni, 2022. "The Italian nominal interest rate conundrum: A problem of growth or public finance?," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 313-326.
    5. Tadadjeu Wemba, Dessy-Karl & Essiane, Patrick-Nelson Daniel, 2018. "Autonomie des Banques Centrales et Finances Publiques en Afrique subsaharienne [Autonomy of Central Banks and Public Finances in Sub-saharan Africa]," MPRA Paper 100828, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Elena Seghezza, 2020. "Governor Baffi’s View on the Italian Great Inflation," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 6(3), pages 563-584, November.
    7. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Debora Di Gioacchino, 2004. "Fiscal- Monetary Policy and Debt Management: a Two Stage Dynamic Analysis," Working Papers in Public Economics 74, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma.
    8. Eugenio Gaiotti & Alessandro Secchi, 2012. "Monetary policy and fiscal dominance in Italy from the early 1970s to the adoption of the euro: a review," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 141, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    9. Bodea, Cristina & Higashijima, Masaaki, 2017. "Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy: Can the Central Bank Restrain Deficit Spending?," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 47-70, January.
    10. Oliver Pamp, 2008. "Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions: Explaining Fiscal Retrenchment in the European Union," European Political Economy Review, European Political Economy Infrastructure Consortium, vol. 8(Spring), pages 4-39.
    11. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli & Stefano Ugolini, 2023. "Fiscal Dominance, Monetary Policy and Exchange Rates: Lessons from Early-Modern Venice," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 23205, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.

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