IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/cesifo/v63y2017i1p78-96..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Optimal Income Tax in an Extensive Labor Supply Life-cycle Model

Author

Listed:
  • Philippe Choné
  • Guy Laroque

Abstract

This article considers a stationary economy populated with overlapping generations that reproduce identically in continuous time. Each dynasty has a productivity and an opportunity cost of going to work that vary with age. Labor supply is extensive. At each date, the typical agent can either work full time or not work at all. The decision to work is based on a comparison between after tax income and the privately known opportunity cost of work. We assume that the utilitarian government, which aims at redistributing lifetime utility across dynasties, has a single policy instrument, a stationary income tax schedule function of current income. The article develops a method to study the government problem. This technique is applied to derive the properties of the optimal income tax schedule in a number of examples.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Choné & Guy Laroque, 2017. "Optimal Income Tax in an Extensive Labor Supply Life-cycle Model," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 63(1), pages 78-96.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:63:y:2017:i:1:p:78-96.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/cesifo/ifv027
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Guy Laroque, 2011. "On Income and Wealth Taxation in A Life‐Cycle Model with Extensive Labour Supply," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(554), pages 144-161, August.
    2. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2005. "Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(5), pages 1587-1621, September.
    3. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2010. "The New Dynamic Public Finance," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9222.
    4. Maxim Troshkin & Ali Shourideh, 2014. "Providing Efficient Incentives to Work: Retirement Ages and the Pension System," 2014 Meeting Papers 1319, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Richard Rogerson, 2011. "Individual and Aggregate Labor Supply with Coordinated Working Times," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43, pages 7-37, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Choné & Guy Laroque, 2018. "On the redistributive power of pensions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(3), pages 519-546, March.
    2. Takao Kataoka & Yoshihiro Takamatsu, 2020. "Optimal age‐dependent income taxation in a dynamic extensive model: The case for negative participation tax on young people," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1338-1367, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/45smbs6p8180bqfu6epmve62q2 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/45smbs6p8180bqfu6epmve62q2 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Philippe Choné & Guy Laroque, 2014. "Income tax and retirement schemes," Working Papers hal-01070554, HAL.
    4. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/45smbs6p8180bqfu6epmve62q2 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/45smbs6p8180bqfu6epmve62q2 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Sebastian Koehne & Nicola Pavoni & Arpad Abraham, 2011. "Optimal Income Taxation with Asset Accumulation," 2011 Meeting Papers 1161, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Roozbeh Hosseini & Ali Shourideh, 2019. "Retirement Financing: An Optimal Reform Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(4), pages 1205-1265, July.
    8. Borys Grochulski, 2010. "On the optimality of Ramsey taxes in Mirrlees economies," Working Paper 10-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    9. Stefanie Stantcheva, 2015. "Learning and (or) Doing: Human Capital Investments and Optimal Taxation," NBER Working Papers 21381, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Marcus Berliant & Shota Fujishima, 2017. "Optimal income taxation with a stationarity constraint in a dynamic stochastic economy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(3), pages 739-747, June.
    11. Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, 2011. "The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(4), pages 165-190, Fall.
    12. Berliant, Marcus & Fujishima, Shota, 2012. "Optimal dynamic nonlinear income taxes: facing an uncertain future with a sluggish government," MPRA Paper 41947, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Ted Temzelides, 2005. "Mechanism Design and Payments," 2005 Meeting Papers 11, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Maxim Troshkin & Aleh Tsyvinski & Mikhail Golosov, 2010. "Optimal Dynamic Taxes," 2010 Meeting Papers 320, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    15. Svetlana Pashchenko & Ponpoje Porapakkarm, 2017. "Work Incentives Of Medicaid Beneficiaries And The Role Of Asset Testing," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1117-1154, November.
    16. Lee, Kyung-woo, 2015. "Optimal disability insurance with unobservable skill heterogeneity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 94-109.
    17. Borys Grochulski & Yuzhe Zhang, 2014. "Optimal Institutions in Economies with Private Information: Exclusive Contracts, Taxes, and Bankruptcy Law," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 4Q, pages 353-385.
    18. Roozbeh Hosseini & Larry E. Jones & Ali Shourideh, 2009. "Risk Sharing, Inequality and Fertility," NBER Working Papers 15111, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Mikhail Golosov & Maxim Troshkin & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2011. "Optimal Taxation: Merging Micro and Macro Approaches," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43, pages 147-174, August.
    20. Koehne, Sebastian & Kuhn, Moritz, 2013. "Optimal capital taxation for time-nonseparable preferences," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79951, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    21. Takao Kataoka & Yoshihiro Takamatsu, 2020. "Optimal age‐dependent income taxation in a dynamic extensive model: The case for negative participation tax on young people," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1338-1367, September.
    22. Yosuke Furukawa, 2013. "Increased Regressivity of the Optimal Capital Tax under a Welfare Constraint for Newborn Children," KIER Working Papers 846, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    23. Brendon, C., 2022. "Optimal Nonlinear Savings Taxation," Janeway Institute Working Papers 2210, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    24. Slavík, Ctirad & Yazici, Hakki, 2014. "Machines, buildings, and optimal dynamic taxes," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 47-61.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    extensive labor supply; lifecycle; taxation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:63:y:2017:i:1:p:78-96.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.