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Federalism's Values and the Value of Federalism

Author

Listed:
  • Robert P. Inman

Abstract

What is it about federal governance that makes it so attractive to economists, political philosophers and legal scholars and is there any evidence that would suggest all this attention is warranted? Proponents see federalism as a means to more efficient public and private economies, as the foundation for increased political participation and democratic stability and as an important check on governmental abuses of personal rights and liberties. This study provides a working definition of federal governance and classifies a sample of 73 countries as either a constitutionally based federal democracy, an administratively based federal democracy, a unitary democracy, a federal dictatorship or a unitary dictatorship. Governance is then related to 11 measures of economic, democratic, and rights performance. Three conclusions follow. First, decentralized policy-making does have a unique contribution to make to a society's ability to enforce property rights, to protect political and civil rights, and then because of such rights protections, to enhance private sector economic performance. Second, while policy decentralization is the key to federalism's strong rights and economic performance and can be achieved within a unitary government by fiat, constitutionally established provincial (or state) governments provide an extra and important protective barrier for policy decentralization. Federal institutions protect policy decentralization, and policy decentralization provides federalism's valued outcomes. Third, federalism needs democracy; there is no evidence that adding policy decentralization or provinces to a dictatorship significantly improves a dictatorship's economic or rights performance. (JEL codes: H11, H77, H70) Copyright , Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert P. Inman, 2007. "Federalism's Values and the Value of Federalism," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 53(4), pages 522-560, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:53:y:2007:i:4:p:522-560
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/cesifo/ifm018
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Robert P. Inman, 2010. "States in Fiscal Distress," NBER Working Papers 16086, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Gerald A. Carlino & Robert P. Inman, 2013. "Macro fiscal policy in economic unions: states as agents," Working Papers 13-40, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    3. Montolio, Daniel & Trillas, Francesc, 2013. "Regulatory federalism and industrial policy in broadband telecommunications," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 18-31.
    4. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9oaso1e0k4 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Emilio Depetris-Chauvin & Ruben Durante & Emilio Gutierrez, 2022. "Political Alignment and Inter-Jurisdictional Cooperation: Evidence from Crime in Mexico," Working Papers 178, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    6. Robert P. Inman, 2010. "States in fiscal distress," Regional Economic Development, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Oct, pages 65-80.
    7. Ruben Durante & Emilio Gutierrez, 2013. "Fighting Crime with a Little Help from my Friends: Party Affiliation, Inter‐jurisdictional Cooperation and Crime in Mexico," Sciences Po publications 17, Sciences Po.
    8. Anwar Shah, 2010. "Empowering States and Provinces or Unshackling Local Governments: Does It Matter for Peace, Order, Good Government, and Growth? (The Gustav Ranis Lecture)," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 49(4), pages 333-362.
    9. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9oaso1e0k4 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9oaso1e0k4 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Zegras, Christopher & Nelson, Joshua & Macário, Rosário & Grillo, Christopher, 2013. "Fiscal federalism and prospects for metropolitan transportation authorities in Portugal," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 1-12.
    12. Prakash Chandra Jha, 2015. "Theory of fiscal federalism: an analysis," Journal of Social and Economic Development, Springer;Institute for Social and Economic Change, vol. 17(2), pages 241-259, October.
    13. Ruben Durante & Emilio Gutierrez, 2013. "Fighting Crime with a Little Help from my Friends: Party Affiliation, Inter‐jurisdictional Cooperation and Crime in Mexico," Working Papers hal-03460752, HAL.
    14. Pilar Sorribas-Navarro & Antoni Castells & Albert Solé-Ollé & Núria Bosch & José Mª Durán-Cabré & Alejandro Esteller-Moré & Maite Vilalta Ferrer, 2017. "The long-awaited reform of the regional financing system / La esperada reforma de la financiación autonómica / L’esperada reforma del finançament autonòmic," IEB Reports ieb_report_1_2017, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    15. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9oaso1e0k4 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Gutierrez, Emilio, 2015. "Fighting Crime with a Little Help from my Friends: Political Alignment, Inter-Jurisdictional Cooperation and Crime in Mexico," CEPR Discussion Papers 10769, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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