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Reciprocity and conditional cooperation between great tit parents

Author

Listed:
  • Rufus A. Johnstone
  • Andrea Manica
  • Annette L. Fayet
  • Mary Caswell Stoddard
  • Miguel A. Rodriguez-Gironés
  • Camilla A. Hinde

Abstract

When individuals invest in a common good, an efficient outcome is hard to achieve, because each can free ride on others’ efforts. This problem can lead parents that raise their young together to reduce their investment in care, with negative consequences for offspring. Here, we present a mathematical model to show that a strategy of conditional cooperation, in which parents take turns feeding their young, can help to resolve this problem. To test this idea, we studied the behavior of great tit parents raising chicks together. We found that parents alternated visits to the nest more than would be expected by chance, speeding up their feeding rate after their partner had visited the chicks, but slowing down again once they had visited in turn. This effect was not mediated by visit-to-visit changes in offspring begging intensity, although females (but not males) were influenced by mean begging levels across broods. We conclude that conflict over parental investment in this species is partly ameliorated by a simple form of reciprocity.

Suggested Citation

  • Rufus A. Johnstone & Andrea Manica & Annette L. Fayet & Mary Caswell Stoddard & Miguel A. Rodriguez-Gironés & Camilla A. Hinde, 2014. "Reciprocity and conditional cooperation between great tit parents," Behavioral Ecology, International Society for Behavioral Ecology, vol. 25(1), pages 216-222.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:beheco:v:25:y:2014:i:1:p:216-222.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/beheco/art109
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Claudia Keser & Frans Van Winden, 2000. "Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(1), pages 23-39, March.
    2. Rufus A. Johnstone & Camilla A. Hinde, 2006. "Negotiation over offspring care--how should parents respond to each other's efforts?," Behavioral Ecology, International Society for Behavioral Ecology, vol. 17(5), pages 818-827, September.
    3. John M. McNamara & Alasdair I. Houston & Zolta´n Barta & Jose´-Luis Osorno, 2003. "Should young ever be better off with one parent than with two?," Behavioral Ecology, International Society for Behavioral Ecology, vol. 14(3), pages 301-310, May.
    4. Fischbacher, Urs & Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001. "Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 397-404, June.
    5. Tim Clutton-Brock, 2009. "Cooperation between non-kin in animal societies," Nature, Nature, vol. 462(7269), pages 51-57, November.
    6. Bruno S. Frey & Stephan Meier, 2004. "Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior: Testing "Conditional Cooperation" in a Field Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1717-1722, December.
    7. C.A. Hinde, 2006. "Negotiation over offspring care?--a positive response to partner-provisioning rate in great tits," Behavioral Ecology, International Society for Behavioral Ecology, vol. 17(1), pages 6-12, January.
    8. Rufus A. Johnstone, 2011. "Load lightening and negotiation over offspring care in cooperative breeders," Behavioral Ecology, International Society for Behavioral Ecology, vol. 22(2), pages 436-444.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tina A Barbasch & Rebecca Branconi & Robin Francis & Madison Pacaro & Maya Srinivasan & Geoffrey P Jones & Peter M Buston, 2021. "Negotiations over parental care: a test of alternative hypotheses in the clown anemonefish," Behavioral Ecology, International Society for Behavioral Ecology, vol. 32(6), pages 1256-1265.

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