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Evidentiary Standards and Information Acquisition in Public Law

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  • Matthew C. Stephenson

Abstract

This article considers the type of evidence that an overseer (e.g., a court) should require before allowing a government agent to take some proposed action. The court can increase agency research incentives by prohibiting actions unless the agent produces supporting evidence, and/or by permitting action even when the agent uncovers adverse evidence. The court thus faces a trade-off between an evidentiary standard's ex post effects on the agent's policy decision and its ex ante effects on the agent's incentive to do research. An extension allows the court to make research effort a precondition for action, regardless of the evidence produced. Copyright 2008, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew C. Stephenson, 2008. "Evidentiary Standards and Information Acquisition in Public Law," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 10(2), pages 351-387.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:amlawe:v:10:y:2008:i:2:p:351-387
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/aler/ahn011
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    Cited by:

    1. Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytana, 2020. "Presumption of Innocence and Deterrence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 176(2), pages 377-412.
    2. Peter Bils & Robert J. Carroll & Lawrence S. Rothenberg, 2024. "Strategic avoidance and rulemaking procedures," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(2), pages 156-185, April.
    3. Ian R Turner, 2017. "Working smart and hard? Agency effort, judicial review, and policy precision," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(1), pages 69-96, January.
    4. Svetlana Avdasheva & Svetlana Golovanova & Elena Sidorova, 2022. "Does judicial effort matter for quality? Evidence from antitrust proceedings in Russian commercial courts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 425-450, June.

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