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Tax Versus Quota Regulation: A Stochastic Model of the Fishery

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  • Robert A. Androkovich
  • Kenneth R. Stollery

Abstract

In a deterministic setting, it has been demonstrated that taxes and quotas can be equivalent regulatory instruments and that both can in principle induce an optimal allocation of resources in markets where externalities are problematic. In this paper we consider growth, harvest, and demand uncertainty within the context of Canada's Pacific halibut fishery and find that, while taxes remain the preferred instrument, the welfare losses arising from the use of individual boat quotas are minor.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert A. Androkovich & Kenneth R. Stollery, 1991. "Tax Versus Quota Regulation: A Stochastic Model of the Fishery," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 73(2), pages 300-308.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:73:y:1991:i:2:p:300-308.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1242714
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    Cited by:

    1. Hansen, Lars Gårn & Jensen, Frank, 2017. "Regulating fisheries under uncertainty," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 164-177.
    2. Ostrom, Elinor (Ed.) & Schlüter, Achim (Ed.), 2007. "The challenge of self-governance in complex, globalizing economies: Collection of revised papers of a PhD seminar," Working Papers 47-2007, University of Freiburg, Chair of Forestry Economics and Planning.
    3. Massimo Del Gatto, 2002. "Fiscal Policies for Italy’s Fishing Industry: Theoretical and Empirical Aspects," QA - Rivista dell'Associazione Rossi-Doria, Associazione Rossi Doria, issue 1, May.
    4. Frank Jensen & Niels Vestergaard, 2003. "Prices versus Quantities in Fisheries Models," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 79(3), pages 415-425.
    5. Newell, Richard G. & Pizer, William A., 2003. "Regulating stock externalities under uncertainty," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(2, Supple), pages 416-432, March.
    6. Jensen, Frank, 2008. "Uncertainty and asymmetric information: An overview," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 89-103, January.
    7. Stefan Ambec & Carine Sebi, 2011. "The distributional impact of common‐pool resource regulations," Indian Growth and Development Review, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 4(2), pages 123-141, September.
    8. Frank Jensen, 2001. "Prices versus Quantities for Common Pool Resources," Working Papers 19/01, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
    9. Rögnvaldur Hannesson & John Kenned, 2005. "Landing Fees versus Fish Quotas," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 81(4).

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