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Transforming A Trilemma Into A Dilemma. A Political Economic Approach To The Recent Crises In Europe

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  • Gabor Vigvari

    (Corvinus University of Budapest)

Abstract

The European Union with its sophisticated institutional system is the most important regional integration on Earth. This tight form of economic integration converges to the level that Dani Rodrik calls hyper globalization in his model, the political trilemma of globalisation. In this model Rodrik assumes that from the three desired element of world politics: deep economic integration, the nation state, and democratic politics only two can be chosen. We can either choose deep integration and the nation state but then we have to abandon democracy; or we can choose deep integration and democracy, but then we have to forfeit the nation state; or we have to circumscribe globalisation to maintain democracy and the nation state. This paper argues, that this trilemma is applicable to the European Union, although with some modification. In our essay we will reduce this trilemma into a dilemma based on the integration theories of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. The recent two crises that hit the European Project, the financial crisis and near collapse of the Eurozone, and the refugee crisis both represent this dilemma. The monetary union and the common labour market, with the Schengen Agreement created an integrated economic area, while in the same time political governing institutions have remained weak that could not respond well enough in times of external pressure. The argument is, that the EU is ‘over integrated’ from an economic perspective, and cannot function properly without a matching level of political integration. This can be achieved either using the neofunctionalist approach and the path of Europeanisation, or using the intergovernmentalista approach. Our main conclusion is that based on events of the last 8 years, it is more likely, and that the intergovernmentalista approach is going to be used. However, this scenario has many possible negative outcomes, out of which the most likely is a multispeed Europe.

Suggested Citation

  • Gabor Vigvari, 2017. "Transforming A Trilemma Into A Dilemma. A Political Economic Approach To The Recent Crises In Europe," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(1), pages 713-722, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:ora:journl:v:1:y:2017:i:1:p:713-722
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    crisis; Economic and Monetary Union; European Union; intergoverenmentalism; neofunctionalism; Schengen Agreement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F50 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - General
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements

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