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Promoting Competition On The Natural Gas Market In The European Union

Author

Listed:
  • Mihaela Ionescu Sas

    (Universitatea din Oradea Facultatea de Stiinte Economice)

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to analyze the development of natural gas infrastructure in the EU and discuss its prospects. The first part is shown the relationship between the regulatory framework of the European Union and development investments to increase competition in the gas sector. High consumption of natural gas in the Member States of the European Union has led to a dramatic increase in imports, and this trend is likely to continue in the future. In addition, resource security after prolonged disruptions of gas supply initiates a series of projects that should enhance security of supply by promoting market integration and allow natural gas flows reversed. In this context the European regulations to encourage investment coming into interstate natural gas transmission pipelines, an industry characterized by a special regulatory framework. The European Commission adopted in 2015 a list of 195 key energy infrastructure projects that will help achieve the objectives on energy and climate in Europe and form key elements of the EU Energy Union. The projects - known as project of common interest (PCIs) - will allow connection Energy Union through gradual integration of energy markets in Europe and the diversification of energy sources and transport routes. In Europe it is found that the gas market is generally well integrated physically in the west, but in Southeast Europe, there is severe congestion. Following the failure of infrastructure projects in the region, Nabucco and South Stream project is investigating BRUA for infrastructure integration in this region of Europe. In the second part of the article analyzes the integration of Romanian gas transmission system in the European market during the next decade. Economic theories of investment in gas infrastructure does not provide clear indications of the conditions in which levels of investment can be effectively achieved, but demonstrated the added value of using a new institutional economic prospects. The author tries to make an assessment of the impact of national gas infrastructure development on the Romanian economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Mihaela Ionescu Sas, 2016. "Promoting Competition On The Natural Gas Market In The European Union," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(1), pages 136-148, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:ora:journl:v:1:y:2016:i:1:p:136-148
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Klein, Michael, 1996. "Competition in network industries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1591, The World Bank.
    2. Russo,Francesco & Schinkel,Maarten Pieter & Günster,Andrea & Carree,Martin, 2011. "European Commission Decisions on Competition," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521295642, September.
    3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Energy infrastructure; investment; natural gas market; projects of common interest;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q43 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Energy and the Macroeconomy

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